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Abstract:
When No Child Left Behind (NCLB) was signed into law in early 2002, many
hoped the legislation would help reduce achievement gaps among traditionally
underperforming populations. For Hispanic students specifically, however,
NCLB has contributed to educational inequality, school segregation, and high
drop-out rates in major ways. Given these outcomes and trends, it is surprising
that members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) and other
Hispanic American interest groups overwhelmingly supported NCLB despite
potentially being able to anticipate how the law would hurt Hispanic students.
The political environment of 2001 left members of the CHC with few options
other than to vote for No Child Left Behind. Public opinion, electoral and
inter-party politics, ideological weakening on education issues among
conservatives, new coalitions, increased diversity among interest groups, and
the advent of 9/11 all contributed to a political environment that facilitated the
passage of NCLB. Furthermore, scholarship on Congressional decisionmaking leads one to believe that the CHC’s support should be expected,
within the context of conditional party government, given the CHC’s ties with
the Democratic Party. Finally, No Child Left Behind contained valuable
provisions that the CHC wanted, and these members of Congress could only
begin to anticipate the shortcomings in the legislation given the information
known in 2001. Therefore, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s support of
No Child Left Behind can be understood given the political environment of
the time, theories of Congressional decision-making, and rational calculations
about the advantages for Hispanic students in the legislation.
Introduction
My interest in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) began in my
own childhood. Throughout my 13 years in American public schools, the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001 seemed to impede many strong educational opportunities for
me. While only nine years of age when NCLB became law, I always knew that my
teachers certainly hated it. When my peers and I asked our teachers why we needed to
be tested, “No Child Left Behind” was the disgruntled reply. “No Child Left Behind”
was the reason for extra exam practice and the reason we had to stop taking
interesting field trips. It was particularly difficult to understand why my schools were
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labeled “failing” year after year even though I knew I was learning each day.
Teachers felt threatened by “state take-overs” and warned their pupils that all-new
instructors might replace the current ones. As I entered my middle and high schools,
it became common knowledge among students that not all demographic groups were
failing, but only certain populations. African American and Hispanic students did not
improve their scores by enough percentage points one year; the next year, students
with disabilities were to blame for the failure to meet “adequate yearly progress”
(AYP). Regardless of my age or the schools, “No Child Left Behind” was an ominous
cloud that hovered over my education and seemingly shaped every curricular and
instructional action for the worse.
I began to understand as I grew older just how and why No Child Left Behind
pervaded my school’s policies. The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001
(officially signed into law on January 8, 2002) is the most recent reauthorization of
the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Departing substantially
from the original 1965 ESEA, NCLB relied primarily on the premise that maintaining
high standards, collecting assessment data annually, and holding schools accountable
for student success would produce measurable gains in achievement. No Child Left
Behind also sought to ensure that all teachers were “highly qualified” and to enhance
school choice for families across the country.
These reforms have been highly controversial and unpopular, particularly
because persistent achievement gaps diminished expectations that No Child Left
Behind would have a lasting, positive impact. No Child Left Behind mandates that
assessment data must be disaggregated based on race, ethnicity, disabilities, income,
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and English proficiency. In these records, all underrepresented groups continue to
illustrate low levels of performance and minimal gains from year to year.1 A number
of scholars and school administrators believe that No Child Left Behind has not only
failed to make gains, but also increased the achievement gaps of the Latino/a2
American population vis-à-vis their white, non-Hispanic3 peers.
Latino/a Americans have some of the lowest high school completion and
college attendance rates of any racial or ethnic group in the United States. Hispanic
students are also one of the most likely populations across the country to drop-out of
high school and live in poverty.4 In the midst of these trends, Latino/a students have
overall low passing rates on standardized exams, with limited English proficient
(LEP) students5 having the lowest passing rates of all subgroups tested.6 States are
responsible for administering these standardized tests and tracking disaggregated

1

Frances Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students: Expanding the Pathway to Higher
Education through Public Policy (New York: Teachers College Press, 2011), 62.
2
I choose to use Latino/a and Hispanic interchangeably in this paper to describe the same
population, while recognizing that these terms can have slightly different meanings in some discourses
and these terms homogenize diverse groups of individuals from a variety of ethnic, racial, national, and
cultural backgrounds.
3
I choose to use “white, non-Hispanic” or “non-Hispanic white” throughout the paper as this
is some of the standard language used by the United States Census to describe this population.
4
Luis R. Fraga, John A. Garcia, Rodney E. Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, and Valerie
Martinez-Ebers, and Gary M. Segura, Latinos in the New Millennium: An Almanac of Opinion,
Behavior, and Policy Preferences, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 387; Barbara
Schneider, Sylvia Martinez, and Ann Ownes, “Barriers to Educational Opportunities for Hispanics in
the United States,” National Academy of Sciences (2006): 1, Accessed June 22, 2013, http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/book/NCK19909/; Sáenz and Murga, Latino Issues, 52; Contreras, Achieving

Equity for Latino Students, 61.
5

Conditions for English language acquisition in schools are particularly important for
Latino/a American students. While many Latino/a students are native English speakers, a large
percentage of the school-age population speak Spanish at home. English acquisition occurs over long
periods of time and depends heavily on the resources available for language development. As these
students are often low-income and attend highly-segregated schools, English language learners are not
as successful as their more advantaged peers. Federal legislation can provide English language learners
with important and consistent access to resources and services. As such a policy, No Child Left Behind
is especially significant for English language learners as it had the potential to create conditions for
access to resources for greater educational opportunity.
6
Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 63.
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data.7 For example, the Arizona’s Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS) exams
are administered to grades 3-12 in reading, writing, and math, in a state with a 40
percent Latino/a student population. There is a prominent gap between non-Hispanic
white and Latino/a students at the elementary level; 82 percent of white students pass
the math exam while 62 percent of Latino/as pass.8 Further, in 2009, only 34 percent
of English language learners passed math at the elementary level, the lowest across all
groups.9
According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
average test scores, Latino/a students did not improve their achievement levels from
2003 to 2009. In 2005 specifically, the NAEP reported that only 28% of English
language learner (ELL) 4th graders “scored at or above the basic achievement level
for reading, compared with 75% of white students.”10 On math exams, “only 55% of
ELL 4th graders scored at or above proficient, compared to 89% of white students.”11
Looking at the scores of 8th graders, only 29% of ELLs scored at or above the basic
achievement in reading and only 29% of the like in math, compared to 75% and 71%
of non-ELLs respectively.12 The same NAEP reports show that gaps in math and

7

States and school districts often use these assessments as exit exams for student graduation
to comply with federal corrective measures and maintain federal funding. These exams often are
additional barriers to graduation for Latino/a students, especially English language learners.
8
Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 62.
9
Ibid. 62.
10
Eugene E. Garcia, “Education Policy for Linguistically and Culturally Diverse Students:
Foundation or Barrier?,” in NCLB at the Crossroads: Reexamining the Federal Effort to Close the
Achievement Gap, ed. Michael A Rebell and Jessica R. Wolff, (New York: Teachers College Press,
2007), 84.
11
Garcia, “Education Policy for Linguistically and Culturally Diverse Students,” 84.
12
Ibid. 84.
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reading begin very early on in life, will likely to continue into later grades, and often
inhibit exit exam completion and graduation from high school.13
Despite the lofty rhetoric and high expectations associated with No Child Left
Behind, some may have been able to predict that NCLB would not produce
measureable gains in achievement for English language learners in particular. In Title
III, NCLB asserts that states must provide for “the inclusion of limited English
proficient (LEP) students, who shall be assessed in a valid and reliable
manner…including to the extent practicable, assessments in the language and form
most likely to yield accurate data on what students know and can do in academic
content areas, until such students have achieved English language proficiency.”14
While this provision aims to guarantee services for ELLs, NCLB expects students to
reach English proficiency in three to five years, whereby schools are no longer
required to test LEP students differently than students fluent in English.15 Social
science research on English language learning suggests that English acquisition
occurs over a long period of time and depends heavily on the context in which
language skills are developed and the opportunities one has to practice the language.16
The ability to communicate in simple conversations, termed “basic interpersonal
communicative skills,” can be acquired within a year, while “academic English” takes

13

Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 61.
United States Congress. No Child Left Behind Act. Washington, DC. 110th. 2001.
15
Steven W. Bender, Raquel Aldana, Gilbert Paul Carrasco, and Joaquin G. Avila, Everyday
Law for Latino/as (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), 78.
16
Carola Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M Suárez-Orozco, and Irina Todorova, “The Challenge of
Learning English,” Learning in a New Land: Immigrant Students in American Society (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008): 151.
14
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an average of seven to ten years of “systematic high-quality training and consistent
exposure” to achieve.17
Quality English language instruction over an extended period of time is
absolutely essential to English acquisition, but unfortunately, services and resources
vary substantially from district to district and state to state. Research suggests that
dual-language programs are most consistently the best service for students. These
programs are most likely to help students achieve in districts that are already highachieving, however; sporadic, low-quality, or poorly funded dual-language programs
are not very successful.18 A National Education Association (NEA) report on the
status of Hispanics in the public education system states English proficiency does not
guarantee achievement in school, but “academic English must be mastered to gain
academic success.”19 As No Child Left Behind could limit student access to English
language acquisition programs, potential barriers to academic achievement for
English language learners could have been anticipated before NCLB became law.
These trends are particularly alarming due to the impressive growth of the
Latino/a population in recent years. The most recent wave of immigration, beginning
in 1965 with the passage of some border-opening legislation, has been predominantly
Latino/a (50%) and Asian (27%).20 The Latino/a population grew 58 percent between
1990 and 2000 and 43 percent between 2000 and 2010.21 The 2010 U.S. Census
reported that persons of Hispanic or Latino/a origin now comprise 16.3 percent of the
17

Suárez-Orozco et al., “The Challenge of Learning English,” 151.
Ibid. 161.
19
Verdugo, “A Report on the Status of Hispanics in Education,” 30.
20
Pew Research Hispanic Center, “A Nation of Immigrants,” Pew Research Center,
Washington, D.C., (2013), accessed June 8, 2013, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/01/29/a-nationof-immigrants/.
21
Fraga et al., Latinos in the New Millennium, 29.
18
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population, growing from roughly 35.3 million to 50.5 million over ten years.22 With
Hispanic Americans projected to comprise 30 percent of the population by 2050, it
becomes increasingly problematic that the U.S. public school system fails to serve
large numbers of Hispanic students.23 Education is strongly linked to political
participation (voting, contacting and lobbying elected officials, earning public office,
etc.), reduced crime rates, increased tax revenues, and decreased demands for public
services (social welfare and criminal justice).24 Conversely, an undereducated
populace with low incomes deteriorates revenues to fund schools, municipal services,
and entitlement programs. 25According to the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES), income increases significantly with educational level for Latino/as.26 Higher
income is linked to positive economic trends, such as more stable employment,
healthier families, and greater investment.27 In a nation that commits itself to
liberalism and opportunity, individuals are entitled to a free and appropriate public
education and the right tools to provide for their own well-being.
With a clear need to provide better educational opportunities for Hispanic
Americans, the effects of the No Child Left Behind Act (or lack thereof) pose a
significant problem for education reformers. Given an understanding of NCLB’s
ineffectiveness for Latino/a students and the frustrations of school district personnel,
one might assume that a Republican president championed conservative (and maybe

22

Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Rio-Vargas, and Nora G. Albert, “The Hispanic Population:
2010,” U.S. Census Bureau (2010), accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf.
23
Rosemary C. Salomone, True American: Language, Identity, and the Education of
Immigrant Children, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010: 50.
24
Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 24.
25
Ibid. 4
26
Sáenz and Murga, Latino Issues, 53.
27
Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 24.
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even xenophobic) interests and ignored all social science on educational best
practices to form No Child Left Behind. In reality, the picture is much more
complicated. No Child Left Behind passed through Congress with overwhelming
bipartisan support and a final vote of 384 to 45 in the House of Representatives and
91 to 8 in the Senate. In fact, not only did NCLB receive such remarkable bipartisan
support, but every member of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) voted for
No Child Left Behind in January, 2002. The backing of the CHC was accompanied
by the support of most civil rights groups and others representing the Latino/a
community. Therefore, we must ask why Hispanic law-makers and community
representatives supported No Child Left Behind and expected the law to reduce
achievement gaps when they may have been able to predict that NCLB would not
help Latino/a American students.
These legislators were not fooled by the legislation, but voted in favor of the
bill for a variety of rational reasons. The formation of No Child Left Behind cannot
be explained through a single narrative as recent accounts sometimes suggest. Rather,
the formulation of NCLB involved a complex interplay between multiple ideologies
and diverse interests. These interests and ideologies contributed to complicated social
science research and studies on educational best practices. In the midst of this
environment, the specific nature of the politics of 2000-2001 ultimately left the CHC
with few other options than to support NCLB. These political circumstances can be
further understood through John W. Kingdon’s theories of Congressional agendasetting and decision-making. Changes in the institutional nature of Congress,
particularly in the House of Representatives, created conditions that directed the

10
members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus to follow Democratic Party
leadership. Finally, No Child Left Behind supplied the CHC with incentives to
support the law through a number of provisions that they predicted would provide
benefits for Hispanic students. With that said, the CHC did anticipate problems in
NCLB, but these issues were just that: anticipated. The Congressional Hispanic
Caucus was willing to vote for NCLB to ensure some victories for Latino/a students
despite some potential shortfalls. The CHC could not have fully understood the extent
and severity of the consequences of NCLB given the information available at the time
of passage. Therefore, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus supported No Child Left
Behind with hopes that the legislation would ignite incremental gains for Latino/a
students and reduce achievement gaps over time.
A Brief History of Latino/a American Education since 1950
To fully understand the plight of Latino/a student vis-à-vis No Child Left
Behind, it is important to understand how federal government actions affected
Hispanic students over time. The achievement of Latino/a students only started to be
a matter of federal government concern in the 1950s and 1960s. Before the Supreme
Court deemed racial segregation in schools unconstitutional in the 1954 Brown v.
Board of Education decision, many Hispanic students were denied access to formal
education. Those that attended school were isolated in “separate-but-equal” facilities
based on fabricated assumptions that Latino/a students were unable to attend nonHispanic white schools due to “language deficiencies.”28 In 1911, roughly 44 percent

28

A. Reynaldo Contreras and Leonard A. Valverde, “The Impact of Brown of the Education
of Latinos,” Journal of Negro Education 63, no. 3 (1994): 471, accessed November 10, 2014,
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/latinos/brown.pdf
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of the non-English-speaking “race” was labeled “retarded” in schools.29 Limited
English-proficient students commonly were encouraged to drop out of school rather
than pursue a diploma. In Brown, the Supreme Court intended not only to desegregate
schools, but also to create a constitutional right to education. While this premise was
ultimately rejected two decades later in the name of federalism, this thinking has
powered a variety of legislation and court decisions promoting equal educational
access for Latino/a students and ELLs.30
In many ways, Brown laid the groundwork for President Lyndon Johnson’s
Great Society and War on Poverty. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Higher
Education Act of 1965, Upward Bound, and the TRiO programs31 all assisted
underrepresented students in gaining access to higher education and helped to expand
the Latino/a American middle class.32 Simultaneously, a number of Civil Rights laws
helped to ensure educational rights for Hispanic English language learners. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provided in Title VI that “no person can be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of,” or “be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving financial assistance” from the federal government
on account of race, color, or national origin.33 This antidiscrimination provision was
formally applied to ELLs in 1974 after the Lau v. Nichols decision (see below) and
the 1974 federal Equal Educational Opportunity Act (EEOA). The EEOA created an
explicit link between national origin/ethnicity and language, stating that “No state
29

Salomone, True American, 25.
Ibid. 104.
31
TRiO is series of programs that aim to provide disadvantaged students with opportunities
academic success, administered by the federal Department of Education and created by the Higher
Education Act of 1965.
32
Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 7.
33
Salomone, True American, 106.
30
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shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
race, color, sex, or national origin, by the failure by an educational agency to take
appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impeded equal participation by
its students in its instructional programs.”34 With new legal opportunities and rights,
national organizations representing Latino/a Americans, such as the Mexican Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) and the National Council of La Raza
(NCLR), started to have a presence in Washington.35
These developments facilitated the passage of another component of President
Johnson’s War on Poverty: the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. As
education was historically controlled by states and local municipalities, the original
passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965
revolutionized the relationship between the federal government and school systems.36
The signature program of the legislation, Title I, would infuse an unprecedented sum
of federal funding into remedial instruction for educationally and socioeconomically
disadvantaged students.37 Title I continues to provide nearly $12 billion annually to
schools across the country.38
Title VI of the ESEA, a 1968 amendment entitled the Bilingual Education Act
(BEA), sought to address the “special educational needs” of students age three to
eighteen whose families fell within certain poverty guidelines and which were of
“limited English-speaking ability” (LESA). These LESA students were defined as
34

United States Congress. Equal Education Opportunities Act. Washington, DC. 93rd. 1974.
Victoria MacDonald (Assistant Professor of Education) in discussion with the author,
March, 2014.
36
Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 55.
37
Salomone, True American, 107.
38
Andrew Rudalevige, “The Politics of No Child Left Behind,” Education Next (Fall 2003):
63, accessed October 15, 2014, http://educationnext.org/the-politics-of-no-child-left-behind/.
35
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“children who come from environments where the dominant language is other than
English.”39 This legislation neither defined nor mandated bilingual education, but
rather provided short-term discretionary funds rewarded on a competitive basis for
existing programs and experimental pedagogical approaches to English language
instruction.40 According to the BEA, this included instruction that imparts
“knowledge of the history and culture associated with their languages,” home-school
collaborations, and dropout prevention programs for “students having need of
bilingual education.”41 In this way, for the first time in U.S. history, the national
government recognized that non-English languages could contribute to closing the
achievement gap for LEP students. The BEA was the first bilingual and bicultural
education program passed at the federal government level.
The rights of English language learners were further recognized six years later
in the Supreme Court decision in Lau v. Nichols in 1974. The Supreme Court
concluded that failing to accommodate to English language learners violates Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and school districts cannot deny linguistically
appropriate accommodations or equal educational opportunities on the basis of
ethnicity.42 After the decision, the Lau Remedies were released by the Office of Civil
Rights to instruct states and school districts how to “eliminate past educational

39

United States Congress. Bilingual Education Act, Elementary and Secondary Education
Act. Washington, D.C. 90th. 1968.
40
David Nieto, “A Brief History of Bilingual Education in the United States,” Perspectives on
Urban Education 6, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 63, accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.urbanedjournal.org/
review/sites/urbanedjournal.org/files/pdf_archive/PUE-v6i1.pdf#page=61.
41
Wayne E. Wright, “Bilingual Education Act 1968: Evolution of Federal Policy and
Implications of No Child Left Behind For Language Minority Students,” Education Policy Studies
Laboratory: Language Policy Research Unit (2005): 3-4, accessed July 5, 2013.
http://epsl.asu.edu/epru/documents/EPSL-0501-101-LPRU.pdf.
42
Garcia, “Education Policy for Linguistically and Culturally Diverse Students,” 86.
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practices ruled unlawful” in the decision.43 Bilingual education programs were
mentioned as ways to provide a meaningful education to these children with limited
English proficiency.44 Furthermore, the Office of Civil rights implemented guidelines
to implement bilingual education programs in hundreds of school districts who did
not serve LEP students.45 In 1981, Castaneda v. Pickard reinforced the Lau ruling.
Castaneda charged the Raymondville Independent School District in Texas with
discrimination based on race and ethnicity because his Mexican American children
were in segregated and low-quality bilingual education programs.46 Federal courts
ruled with Castaneda and extended Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to all
educational institutions, whether they receive federal funding or not, via the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act on 1974.47 In these ways, Latino/a American students
gained increased rights through federal courts in the wake of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 48
While Hispanic students enjoyed legislative and judicial victories in the 1960s
and 1970s, new quota-reducing immigration legislation allowed more immigrants to
43

Office of Civil Rights, “Task-Force Findings Specifying Remedies Available for
Eliminating Past Educational Practices Ruled Unlawful under Lau v. Nichols,” Office of Civil Rights,
1975, accessed July, 12, 2013, http://www.stanford.edu/~hakuta/www/ LAU/IAPolicy/
IA3ExecLauRemedies.htm.
44
Bender et al., Everyday Law for Latino/as, 93
45
Ibid. 93.
46
“Casteñeda vs. Pickard,” Standford LAU project, accessed November 13, 2014,
http://web.stanford.edu/ ~hakuta/www/LAU/IAPolicy/IA1bCastaneda.htm.
47
Garcia, “Education Policy for Linguistically and Culturally Diverse Students,” 86.
48
Some court cases undermined guarantees to Latino/as in some significant ways from the
Lau and Castaneda decisions. The central achievement of Lau remains intact today: providing no
meaningful instruction for ELLs is discriminatory regardless of the intention of the school. However,
three important cases, Guardian Association v. Civil Service Commission (1983), Alexander v. Choate
(1985), and Alexander v Sandoval (2001) have made it such that one can only sue if there is a
discriminatory intention, rather than an unintentional discriminatory impact.47 Making it more difficult
to prove discrimination in schools, Latino/a students and their families have less power to challenge
ineffectual resources and programs for English language learning developments are generally viewed
as steps backward for Latino/a students.
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enter the United States in the same era and for decades thereafter.49 Immigrants began
arriving from new countries in Central and South America. These nations had recent
experience with U.S. influence and with political instability and violence.50 Many
new refugee students suffered in schools from socio-psychological turmoil, separation
from families back in their home countries, alienation due to growing xenophobic
attitudes, fear of deportation, and difficulty communicating with teachers and
administrators.51 With a growing Latino/a population, some Americans felt that
immigrants were disrupting economic patterns. Hispanic populations increased
during a period of economic stagnation in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Deindustrialization and globalization of the economy contributed to these attitudes, as
traditional working class occupations were increasingly no longer available to many
individuals in the United States. At the same time, Hispanic populations also started
to settle in new areas of the U.S., such as southern states like Georgia and the
Carolinas. With these changing demographic patterns, support for expanding federal
services for Latino/a American students diminished.52
In the 1980s, new demographic characteristics called for more attention for
Hispanic students. Simultaneously, education policy significantly shifted objectives
toward greater accountability measures. In 1980, the National Center for Education
Statistics’ published the first major report on Latino/as and schools; The Condition of
Education of Hispanic Americans highlighted high drop-out rates, low college

49

MacDonald, in discussion with author, March 2014.
Victoria-María MacDonald, “Un paso hacia adelante, y otro hacia atrás (One step forward,
one step back): Latinos and Schooling in the 1980s and 1990s,” Latino Education in the United States:
A Narrated History from 1513-2000, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994: 279.
51
Victoria-María MacDonald, “Un paso hacia adelante,” 279.
52
Ibid. 279.
50
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participation, underrepresentation in math and science, and lower scores on
standardized tests than non-Hispanic white peers.53 This publication was relatively
ineffective at gaining enough support for major legislative action or increased funding
at the time, however.54 In contrast to the original ESEA, federal policy sought to
address these concerns through accountability measures and higher standards rather
than through funding.55 Beginning with the Reagan Administration’s publication of A
Nation at Risk in 1983, the education narrative emphasized that Americans were
settling for “mediocrity” in schools, causing the U.S. to fall behind economically in
the global marketplace. 56 A Nation at Risk also placed a greater emphasis on meeting
standards and learning the “new basics” in English, mathematics, science, social
studies, and computer science curricula.57
These sentiments were reiterated again in 1991 with President George H.W.
Bush’s “America 2000” and in 1994 with President Bill Clinton’s Improving
America’s Schools Act (IASA). The IASA was a revamped reauthorization of ESEA,
which also focused on accountability and meeting academic standards.58 Bilingual
education lost professional and public support as accountability through high-stakes
testing became common-place. In 1994, President Clinton signed an executive order
“Educational Excellence for Hispanic Americans,” which created a task force that
researched and produced an extensive report entitled, Our Nation on the Fault Line:
Hispanic American Education. The report concluded that Hispanic education was in a

53

MacDonald, “Un paso hacia adelante,” 279.
Ibid.
55
Rudalevige, “The Politics of No Child Left Behind,” 65.
56
Contreras, Achieving Equity for Latino Students, 56.
57
Ibid. 56.
58
Ibid. 57.
54
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state of crisis and the achievement gap between Latinos and non-Hispanic white
Americans was “intolerable.” Our Nation on the Fault Line also considered how
schools were “re-segregating” in the 1990s as few non-Hispanic white peers attended
predominately African American and Latino/a-isolated urban schools.59 While this
report highlighted the challenges facing Latino/a American students, the Clinton
Administration did not pass legislation specifically addressing the needs of these
pupils nor renewed a commitment to bilingual education funding. In the 1990s, the
education narrative centered on the growing “standards movement” which culminated
in No Child Left Behind.60
During the same decade, numerous English-only government and school
policies deemed the use of Spanish illegal. In 1998, California housed the most
famous example, Proposition 227, which banned bilingual education in public
schools. This initiative was part of a series of campaigns conducted across the United
States by Ron Unz, former Republican gubernatorial candidate in California and
famous supporter of English-immersion education.61 Unz aimed to replace bilingual
programs with English immersion curricula because he argued that bilingual
programs were a “failed experiment” that prompted students to drop-out of school
and never learn English.62 Viewed by many Latino/a communities as discriminatory,
these policies shaped Hispanic American education in new ways and encouraged a
more staunchly assimilationist approach to the education of a growing Latino/a
population.

59

MacDonald, “Un paso hacia adelante.”
Rudalevige, “The Politics of No Child Left Behind,” 64.
61
Bender et al., Everyday Law for Latino/as, 84.
62
Ibid. 94.
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This brief history leads us to the formation of No Child Left Behind. With
achievement gaps pervading across the country, the standards movement culminated
in the omnibus NLCB in 2001 and began to define a new trajectory for Hispanic
American students.
The Perfect Storm: The Politics of Formation
The passage of No Child Left Behind is often chalked up to the power of
Senator Ted Kennedy to reach across the aisle and gain large coalitions. In the New
York Times’ commemorative tribute to Kennedy’s life, written only days after he
passed, the Times wrote, “When President George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind
bill was floundering in 2001, it was Mr. Kennedy he turned to and who saw it into
law.”63 Indeed, Senator Kennedy was deeply concerned with achievement gaps
among students and sought to solve inequities in education.64 As such, Ted Kennedy
did have a prominent role in building consensus for NCLB. However, the stage was
already set for the passage of education reform before and despite Kennedy’s efforts.
The political environment in 2001 was much more complex with many more actors
than accounts that center on Kennedy acknowledge. Ideological weakening on
education issues among conservatives, public opinion, electoral politics, inter-party
competition, increased diversity among interest groups, and new coalitions all
contributed to a political environment that facilitated the passage of NCLB. Given
this advantageous environment, the specific nature of the politics of 2000-2001
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ultimately left the Congressional Hispanic Caucus with few options when voting for
NCLB.
The Process of Ideological Weakening
While his father tried to make a name for himself as “the education president,”
George W. Bush charted new territory for a Republican by successfully passing
comprehensive legislative reform on a traditionally Democratic policy issue. Bush’s
centrism on education policy, in particular, was a relatively new phenomenon within
the Republican Party. It may appear odd that a major increase of federal influence
would occur under a conservative president and with broad support from conservative
legislators.65 While resistance to Bush’s proposals remained, a process of “ideological
weakening” within the Republican Party on the specific issue of education provoked
many Republicans to compete with Democrats for relevance on education policy.66
Lee Anderson, author of Congress and the Classroom: From the Cold War to “No
Child Left Behind,” proposes that, in fact, this process of ideological weakening in
education policy over time is the determining factor to explain the passage of
NCLB.67 While liberals and conservatives continued to emphasize traditional partisan
values (such as equality of opportunity for liberals and fiscal responsibility for
conservatives), the gap between liberals and conservatives on the role of the federal
government in education policy had narrowed since the 1950s.68
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Anderson defines “federal role” as any action taken by the federal government
to influence state and local education practices.69 Until the 1950s, education policy
was largely determined by states and therefore, the period from 1785 to 1950 was
characterized by a “limited federal role.”70 In the 1950s and 1960s, many education
policy debates revolved around two issues: religion in schools and segregation. On
both of these issues, conservatives wanted education policy to be determined strictly
by states to allow more conservative areas of the country to retain their practices visà-vis religion and segregation. To pass legislation, proponents of federal education
reform needed to provide concessions to conservatives. For example, advocates of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 used categorical grants for
parochial schools and disproportionately large payments to the South to mollify
conservative opponents of federal education intervention. As the Democratic and
Republican Parties were very different in the 1960s than they are today, NCLB would
not have passed if there was such aid to parochial schools.71
In turn, Anderson describes a “federal-control” conundrum whereby small
increases in federal education funding inevitably led to an additional increase in
federal supervision and involvement to ensure the funds are well spent. Anderson
notes the remarks of Senator Absalom W. Robertson (D-VA) during the Senate floor
debate on passing ESEA in 1965: “Not only does Federal control follow Federal
funds, but it is the constitutional duty of a Congress which appropriates Federal
money to supervise its expenditure.”72 In this regard, conservatives recognized that
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federal control was the logical consequence of an increase in federal funding; this
recognition produced fears in 1965 that were no longer present during the debate over
NCLB.
The ideological weakening process was facilitated by a number of factors.
First of all, after the early to mid-1960s, some of the most partisan issues ceased to be
agenda priorities. After Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, segregated schools
were no longer constitutional, forcing districts across the country to integrate. While
de jure segregation did not dissolve in all parts of the country for some years, the
Brown v. Board decision (and subsequently the Civil Rights Act of 1964) severely
limited efforts within Congress to preserve segregation. At the same time, the
Supreme Court ruled in Engel v. Vitale in 1962 that schools could not authorize a
voluntary prayer at the start of the school day.73 President Kennedy also helped
relieve tensions among liberals about the influence of religion on government, as he
proved that a Catholic president could act independently from the Vatican.74 While
these issues remained partisan and contentious, religion and segregation in schools
were slowly brushed off of the table and conservatives had less incentive to maintain
limited federal control over school districts.
Second, a series of education policies were extremely difficult to vote against
leading up to NCLB. Anderson charts ideological weakening through analyzing key
pieces of legislation and how policy-makers revised their debates over time. These
laws include the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the Elementary and
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Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, the Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, the Goals 2000:
Education America Act of 1994, and the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994.75
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (the original version of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act as it is known today)
illustrates one cause that helped to change the ideological status quo. It became
increasingly more politically difficult for members of Congress to oppose legislation
that aimed to assist innocent and underserved populations, such as students with
disabilities.
Anderson argues that the Education for All Handicapped Children Act has
some important similarities to NCLB: 1) the level of federal government involvement
departs from past practices and 2) there was overwhelming support in Congress at the
time of enactment.76 In this example, Anderson highlights how the ideological shift
among conservatives began slowly with individual pieces of legislation. As opposed
to other areas of public policy, education reform in particular was consistent with
conservative ideologies. In theory, educational opportunities allowed individuals to
earn success and wealth without government assistance or reliance on “entitlement
programs.” Conservatives could support federal involvement in education policy as
the public education system provided individuals with opportunities to achieve the
American Dream based on merit. While there was a larger gap between liberal and
conservative ideologies at the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children
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Act than at NCLB, these pieces of legislation enacted change in the same direction
toward greater acceptance of a more prominent federal role in education.
The gap between liberal and conservative ideologies continued to shrink when
the Department of Education (DOE) consolidated all of the different educational
services in the federal government. The Department of Education’s existence
solidified the role of the federal government in education policy. Many conservatives
opposed the establishment of the DOE and have wanted to abolish the Department
ever since, despite the DOE’s official non-partisanship. While this cohort of the
Republican Party remained vocal, more conservatives dissented from this position
and supported an increased role of the federal government than in the 1950s and
1960s. Like the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, the creation of the
Department of Education had similarities with the passage of No Child Left Behind;
both pieces of legislation had bipartisan support and were characterized by
unconventional behavior of liberals and conservatives.77 The establishment of the
DOE was both a consequence and a cause of the “federal control” conundrum
described above: as the federal government began to invest more in education, there
needed to be more government oversight and involvement to ensure these funds were
spent efficiently and effectively.
Anderson argues that No Child Left Behind was the culmination of five
decades of ideological weakening and the end of conservative resistance to federal
intervention into education policy. As past involvement encouraged more future
involvement, the federal government needed to become increasingly involved to hold
schools accountable for effective use of federal dollars. While tension between
77
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conservative and liberal ideologues remains on some areas of education policy (such
as the appropriate role of Washington via “unfunded mandates” or the influence of
state departments of education), this process of ideological weakening, that occurred
over a number of decades, certainly set the stage for a major bipartisan education
reform.78 The ideological weakening process created new electoral dynamics and
contests for control. Democrats no longer dominated the education policy arena,
which increased tension between the different parties.
Public Opinion and the Years before NCLB
Compared to earlier decades when foreign affairs and economic troubles
dominated national headlines, education was a particularly important issue for the
public at large and a major priority on the public policy agenda in the 1990s and at
the turn of the 20th century. Education was a defining issue in the 1996 presidential
election and gave Bill Clinton an advantage with swing voters against Bob Dole. As
education reform was traditionally associated with the Democratic Party (only
recently did some Republicans start to take a stake on the issue with A Nation at
Risk), those interested in education reform were attracted to Bill Clinton and the
Democrats. Education was a particularly salient issue for women and “soccer moms,”
who were identified as vital swing voters. While Clinton won the men’s vote 49
percent to 39 percent, Clinton received 59 percent of women’s votes in 1996,
compared to the 35 percent that Dole received. In post-election analyses by the
Republican Party, pundits and policy-makers identified education as one of the key
issues contributing to the electoral “gender gap.” While 24 percent of men believed
that “improving education” should be a top priority when choosing candidates and 44
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percent believed education was “extremely important,” women held these beliefs at
the tune of 29 percent and 52 percent, respectively.79 With a prospering economy and
relatively little armed conflict, domestic matters became a priority. The importance of
education to the public at this time significantly increased the likelihood of legislation
on the issue. All policy-makers would have had constituents that cared about (and
more importantly, made voting decisions based on) education priorities.
As education issues gave Democrats a significant electoral advantage in 1996,
Republicans understood the importance of remaining salient on reform. Major leaders
in the Republican Party learned from the 1996 election and changed how they framed
their view on education. Serving as governor of Texas at the time, George W. Bush
stated in the Washington Post in 1996 that “the Republican Party must put a
compassionate face on a conservative philosophy…The message to women…is we
care about people…There is no question that from a political perspective, he
[Clinton] stole the education issue and it affected the women’s vote…Republicans
must say that we are for education.”80 In 1997, Lamar Alexander, former Secretary of
Education and current Senator of Tennessee, suggested similar policy recalculations
for the Republican Party: “we conservatives…must learn to say what we are for in
plain words…Eliminating the Department of Education and encouraging home
schooling alone do not answer the education question for 90 percent of American
families. We must paint a vivid picture of how we will help create the best schools in
the world.”81 These notable conservative voices highlighted a deliberate effort to shift
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the Party’s public image on education and respond to an issue of high national
importance. With this understanding, Republicans continued to become more
supportive of a national stance on education.
President Clinton and Congressional Republicans engaged in a contest for
control in the mid-to-late 1990s that continued during the formation of No Child Left
Behind. President Clinton won in 1996 with an understanding of substantial 1994
Republican gains, and generally repositioned Democratic policy to emphasize
opportunity rather than redistribution. During his second term, Clinton expanded his
efforts to revitalize the public school system through a staunchly centrist agenda: high
academic standards, college tuition benefits, and school modernization.82 New
Democrats also began to embrace a more centrist agenda, as a lack of improvement in
urban schools encouraged more liberals to embrace accountability and standards as
innovative strategies.83 In his second inaugural address, Clinton stated:
In this new land, education will be every citizen’s most prized possession.
Our schools will have the highest standards in the world, igniting the spark of
possibility in the eyes of every girl and every boy. And the doors of higher
education will be open to all. The knowledge and power of the information
age will be within reach not just of the few but of every classroom, every
library, and every child.84
In his agenda, Clinton made sure to appeal to swing voters on conservative issues by
embracing charter schools, character education, and school choice initiatives.85
Therefore, Republicans supported many of Clinton’s proposals in an attempt
to take credit for education reform and close the education gap with voters.86 Instead
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of voting to cut education funding or dismember the Department of Education, many
Republicans ignored religious and states’ rights conservatives to counter President
Clinton and develop “a favorable public perception of the Party on the issue.87” In
fact, Republicans not only agreed to fund Clinton’s proposals, but they also added
additional spending to support their own initiatives.88 While one can further analyze
how the political dynamics in Clinton’s era led to a stalemate on education, the
contest between Democrats and Republicans over control of centrist education reform
illustrates the influence of public opinion on electoral politics and how the stage was
set for major legislation.
The Electoral Politics of 2000
After a decade of peace and economic prosperity under Clinton, public
opinion polls leading up to the 2000 election showed that domestic issues, such as
education, Social Security, the environment, and health care, continued to have an
unusually high significance to the general population. While foreign relations, civil
rights, Vietnam, the economy, and drugs were major issues to voters in the 40 years
prior, education was at the top of voters’ agendas in 1999 and 2000.89 Budget
surpluses in the late 1990s (with more surpluses anticipated) reduced criticism of
expanding domestic program expenses; candidates could campaign on ambitious
education proposals while avoiding ridicule about deficit reduction or national debt.90
In August, 2000, 91 percent of respondents reported that K-12 education was either
extremely or very important when determining how they would cast their ballot in the
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presidential election. In another poll, 63 percent of individuals revealed that they
believed that education was a more important issue to the candidates than in past
presidential elections. These polls suggested that a majority of people focused their
attention on their dissatisfaction with public education systems and the integral need
to address this problem.91
With this alarmed public opinion, both George W. Bush and Al Gore
understood the broad support for federal leadership and sought to emphasize their
strength on education issues.92 Both candidates understood that education was
traditionally associated with the Democratic Party. A 1999 Pew Research Center poll
found that 52 percent of voters trusted Democrats “to do a better job on education”
compared to 29 percent for Republicans.93 With these perceptions in mind and a
close election anticipated, both candidates aimed to appear moderate to attract centrist
voters and align with Clinton’s popular education positions. Swing voters prompted
both Al Gore and George W. Bush to “race to the center” on all policy issues,
especially education. While there were divisions within the Republican party over
education issues, Bush did not mind ignoring the more extreme wings of his party, as
they were largely unpopular and did not support the moderate views that gave
Democrats an advantage in the 1996.94
George W. Bush boasted about his experiences with developing and
implementing education reform in Texas to champion a moderate “compassionate
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conservative” strategy on education and other domestic policy issues.95 The Bush
campaign gained advantages vis-à-vis Al Gore “by putting forward a comprehensive
education reform plan before Gore had done so” and “by co-opting the leading
centrist reform ideas on education,” forcing Gore “to either say ‘me too’ or try to
differentiate his plan by moving left.”96 With an understanding of these electoral
politics, Congressional conservatives were willing to support Bush’s efforts to win
back the White House.97 Republicans now supported federal funding for education
under new programs in the form of block grants; these grants effectively would
reduce federal control, but deliberately shifted away from previous conservative
initiatives on vouchers and privatization. Republicans only spoke broadly about
public and private school choice under Bush’s leadership.98 In effect, Bush gained
significant ground in the “education gap” of 1996 to be seen as a leader in education
reform.
In attempt to counter Bush’s proactive campaign, Al Gore needed to take
strong and popular positions on education reform. President Clinton successfully
appealed to voters of both parties through his centrist agenda and maintained
relatively high public approval despite his marital scandals. For this reason, Al Gore
remained largely centrist in his campaign as well and followed many of Clinton’s
proposals.99 While Democrats had traditionally supported teachers unions’ and rallied
against school choice measures, public opinion suggested that unions’ were
ineffective and vouchers were potentially a reasonable choice for minority students in
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urban schools.100 Bush took advantage of these issues as “civil rights priorities.” Gore
felt increased pressure to embrace standards-based reform and accountability
measures in his campaign platform, but also had to cater to teachers and minorities,
two of his key constituencies.101 Teachers unions, in particular, were a major source
of donations for Al Gore and Democratic candidates. Therefore, Gore could not
aggressively counter Bush’s education agenda and still cater to the interests in
education reform of the public at large. While Gore and Bush campaigned on similar
accountability plans, as well as promises to increase education spending, Gore’s
campaign efforts on education were defined in response to George Bush’s platform in
an effort to maintain power over the issues. 102
In these ways, the education conversation continued to become a battle for
control. As this battle was a centerpiece of the 2000 election, voters expected action
from either president in their inaugural year in office. The education issue was
unusually important in this 2000 election and prompted both candidates to unleash
ambitious proposals. When George Bush won the election, the Democrats did not
want to cede the issue (particularly successes on the issue) to the President and the
Republican Party. Upon the proposal of No Child Left Behind by the Bush
Administration, Democrats needed to support the legislation to appear ready and
willing to address an issue of high-importance to the public. There were renewed
battles within Congress for influence over education reform in the name of No Child
Left Behind.
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The Congressional Politics in 2001
In contrast to stalemates between President Clinton and Republicans in the
late 1990s, No Child Left Behind succeeded with immense bipartisan support in
Congress. Republican initiative on a traditionally Democrat-controlled issue
provoked actors of both parties to remain salient on the issue. As president-elect,
George Bush invited 20 members of Congress, including Representative John
Boehner (Ohio-R), Senator Judd Gregg (New Hampshire-R), Representative George
Miller (California-D), and Senator Jim Jeffords (Vermont-R), to Texas to discuss his
moderate education reforms. Bush intentionally excluded Senator Ted Kennedy from
this meeting, signaling his desire to form a coalition of Republicans and centrist
Democrats without the status quo education reformers.103 The original No Child Left
Behind proposal was released in the form of a “30-page legislative blueprint” only
three days after Inauguration Day in January 2001. This blueprint contained many of
the major provisions in the final bill, including block grant programs, annual
standardized testing, disaggregated data collection of socioeconomic and ethnic
subgroups, adequate yearly progress requirements, and renewed commitments to Title
I funding.104 Bush found support for his “broad statement of principle” rather than a
specific legislative draft. Such statements proved to be a promising political strategy
for Bush, who could garner support for a bill before details altered legislative
coalitions.105
These components were very similar to many of Clinton’s proposed reforms.
Echoing the sentiments of Congressional Democrats, a Joseph Lieberman aide told
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the Washington Post that Bush “essentially plagiarized our plan.”106 The electoral
advantages of these maneuvers attracted conservatives that previously opposed strong
federal intrusions in education. For example, John Boehner, the new chair of the
House Education and Workforce committee, fundamentally opposed increased
involvement in education, but became dedicated to exploiting Bush’s presidential
victory. He understood that education reform could be a major legislative success and
wanted to be on the right side of that triumph.107 As the Bush Administration received
political points with a coopted Democratic agenda, Democrats fought to keep their
voices heard. This desire for influence and credit facilitated the Bush
Administration’s efforts for bipartisan support of the law. President Bush and his
education advisor, Alexander “Sandy” Kress, worked closely with Gregg to lure Ted
Kennedy to the policy-making discussions. Kennedy was broadly considered a policy
expert and absolutely imperative for the success of NCLB as a major leader in
Congress. As the Republicans “wooed” Kennedy, he agreed to incorporate key
components of Bush’s blueprint into the Senate bill.108 Kennedy subsequently became
one fourth of the “Big Four” Congressional leaders on NCLB, along with Boehner,
Miller, and Gregg.109
Debate over provisions continued throughout the spring and summer of 2001,
particularly on the definition of adequate yearly progress; requirements to
disaggregate data based on race, ethnicity, and other categories; and funding levels. In
the midst of this debate, evolving over the course of seven weeks and 150
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amendments, the major leaders on the bill agreed to suppress any amendments that
altered the original principles of the legislation. Ultimately, the bill passed the Senate
on June 14, 91-8.110 The Bush Administration and major Congressional leadership
understood that the bill would not pass the House without substantial Democratic
support. Boehner was a key factor in hashing out a compromise over state and district
autonomy and provisions on accountability and school choice.
The Bush Administration and the “Big Four” achieved bipartisanship in part
due to a shared, dynamic vocabulary of “accountability,” even though everyone did
not necessarily hold the same definitions. Andrew Rudalevige, professor of political
science at Dickinson College, emphasizes the political viability of this idea, stating,
“How one defines accountability matters greatly in practice, but it proved to matter
far less in politics- in other words, to the term’s usefulness in providing a unifying
theme for the No Child Left Behind debate that could garner broad agreement in
principle even when the policy specifics proved elusive.”111 The conference stage also
required a fair deal of tinkering, revision, and negotiation. In this process, the
conference sought to keep major provisions under the radar of teachers unions and
groups representing educators to avoid the pressure of these special interests.112 The
bill ultimately passed the committee stage, 41-7, followed by a 384 to 45 vote in the
House of Representatives. Republicans constituted 75% of “nay” votes.113
Additionally, leaders in Congress expedited the passage of No Child Left
Behind after September 11, 2001. With both popular and bipartisan support in
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Congress, the 9/11 terrorist attacks made the importance of NCLB even more
apparent. Congressional leadership both wanted to provide the nation with evidence
of successful leadership and felt terrorism further necessitated an improved education
system.114 Recalling anthrax fears that also dominated headlines in 2001,
Representative Major R. Owens (New York-D) stated in his floor comments from
December 2001:
We are going to need a well-educated populace. We should not ever be in a
situation again where the anthrax cleanup is so slow because there are not
enough specialists around to do, especially since anthrax has been a concern
of ours since the Gulf War.115
This accelerated advancement of the bill motivated members of Congress to limit
interest group contributions to the final draft.116 Under these conditions, the Bush
Administration and key members of Congress passed No Child Left Behind with
overwhelming bipartisan support.
The above political dynamics offer part of the explanation for the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s support for No Child Left Behind. The political
environment had all of the necessary momentum for new education reforms. The
Congressional Hispanic Caucus had little choice but to throw in support and join their
Democratic colleagues. Outside of the branches of the federal government, other
political actors in Washington added to the advantageous conditions for education
reform in 2001. Increased interest group diversity and new coalitions among these
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interests contributed to a political environment in 2001 that left the CHC with few
options but to support NCLB.
Interest Group Diversity
President Bush and members of Congress were able to pass NCLB so easily
due to specific changes in the nature and diversity of interest groups. Political
scientists have historically understood the policy-making relationship among
committees in Congress, the executive bureaucracy, and interest groups as “an iron
triangle.” Political scientists also refer to such relationships as a “policy subsystem”
or a “policy network” when there are more than three actors involved in policymaking.117 These policy subsystems are stable relationships among three sets of
actors that mutually accommodate access to and control of the distribution of policy
benefits. Hence, these networks attempt to exclude groups that would disrupt this
control.118 In No Child Left Behind, these stable, exclusionary practices of an iron
triangle/policy subsystem broke down. With unstable relationships among more than
three sets actors, the policy-making process can be better understood as an “education
polity,” described by Carl F. Kaestle as “the institutions and procedures that define
who will participate in education policy decisions and how.”119
As conservatives moved toward the center on education policy issues, more
conservative interest groups began to take a stake in education. These interests were
added to a slew of other interests that had been influencing education policy since as
early as the 1950s. So, there was a large diversity of interest groups vying to be heard
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during the formation of NCLB. The interest groups that influenced the original
passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965 did not have the
same power in 2001. Many traditional education interest groups and researchers
(teachers’ unions, state departments of education, district-level administrators) were
framed as the status quo and shut out from the formation of the law. A greater
diversity and abundance of interest groups also gave each individual group less
power, preventing any interest from seeking an independent or autonomous course of
action without risk of being excluded from the entire process. In this new
environment, the Bush Administration and key members of Congress championed
their agenda without interference from key lobbyists.120
By highlighting the policy-making dynamics from the 1950s to 2007, Carl F.
Kaestle, professor at Brown University, describes the evolution of the “education
polity.”121 Kaestle defines the education polity in the 1950s as structurally simple and
dominated by debate about the federal role in education. It was generally clear which
sides were opposed in this debate. Many wanted to keep the list of federal education
programs quite short, limited to sparse funding for vocational education, lunches, and
American Indians.122 As noted above in the section on ideological weakening,
segregation and religion in schools were the two most divisive issues of the time. The
polity consisted of one strong interest group (the National Education Association)
with a few other notable ones (such as the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC)),
one weak executive component (the very small and impotent Office of Education),
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and one even weaker Congressional role (no friendly congressional committees).123
Within this easily understood framework, the National Education Association (NEA)
was the primary champion of an increase federal aid for schools. The NAACP also
supported greater federal influence, but suffered from strategic complications when
considering how federal funds might flow to segregated schools.124 On the other side
of the aisle, Republicans, Southern Democrats, and Catholics represented by the
NCWC adamantly opposed more federal involvement in education. Southern
Democrats were a particularly strong resistance block, as many committee chairmen
were Representatives from the South. In addition, there was strong resistance to
federal spending on education in the midst of fears of centralized power and
Communism.125 Therefore, political pressures thwarted federal aid in the 1950s, as
most politicians believed in local control or did not want to jump into contentious
religious and racial issues.126 There are sharp ideological differences at this time with
a few major actors in the polity.
The role of interest groups changed in the period from 1957 to 1979 as
members of Congress and the public as a whole began to expect larger involvement
from the federal government. Several overarching trends in the middle of the 20th
century helped legitimize greater federal government influence, including major
leadership in World War II and subsequent peace accords, the growing connections
among states, and key Supreme Court decisions.127 Both the Civil Rights Movement
and the Cold War increased the responsibilities of the federal government in the
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classroom. With the Brown v. Board of Education decision, the federal government
needed to enforce desegregation and integration in Southern states, such as the
controversy with the “Little Rock Nine.”128 Washington could no longer resist
intervention on racial segregation issues after the Brown decision as they had earlier
in the 1950s. Furthermore, President Kennedy’s assassination, Martin Luther King’s
leadership, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 all increased support for racial justice
throughout the United States and validated federal action to counteract
discrimination.129 Simultaneously, fears about Sputnik and losing ground to the USSR
provoked the passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, which
aimed to bolster math, science, and foreign language education.130 Furthermore, as
mentioned above, John F. Kennedy helped reduce anti-Catholic sentiments and
resistance to compromise on aid to parochial schools.131
The Kennedy Administration also paved the way for major federal
government involvement by establishing the lasting precedent of the omnibus
education bill that synthesized both categorical and general aid into one piece of
legislation and capitalized on particularly popular sections for passage. While
Kennedy faced resistance on racial, religious, and local-state control issues, the
omnibus bill manifested itself under President Johnson via the ESEA in 1965.132 The
ESEA redefined federal priorities on education as part of Johnson’s larger War on
Poverty (and Kennedy’s vision for education). In turn, the Office of Education
expanded its duties and its budget and began to take responsibility for students with
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historical disadvantages: women, Latino/as, African Americans, English Language
Learners, children with disabilities, and Native Americans.133 Kaestle argues that
something “approximating an iron triangle” emerged at this point in time, with
education interest groups, the Office of Education, and education-related
congressional committees.134 In this way, the polity shifted from the 1950s with a
greatly expanded role of the federal government in education policy and more
acceptance of this role on both sides of the aisle. As more individuals accepted this
new federal role, a greater number of actors and interests vied for a voice on
education policy.135
Finally, Kaestle describes a modern era from 1980-2007 where the federal
role in education stopped expanding linearly. Presidents during this time both
expanded and contracted the federal influence over education in an uneven trajectory.
In addition, federal actions transcended issues of religion and race and began to
intervene into curricula. President Reagan cut education spending, championed block
grants with more choices for local school districts, and discussed abolishing the
Department of Education. Despite these efforts to contract the federal influence on
education, Reagan’s Secretary of Education, Terrell Bell, appointed a commission
that published A Nation at Risk, which reported deficits in academic achievement
across the country and stimulated a perceived national crisis in education.136 Even
after this apparent call to action, President Reagan’s next Secretary of Education,
William Bennett, understood federal influence as “criticism and advice” rather than
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Johnson-era increases in funding.137 Bennett made a famous trip to Chicago in 1987,
during which he declared that the city had the worst schools in the country, and then
simply returned to Washington after implying that the Chicago schools should do
something about it.138
In these ways, the Reagan Administration created ambiguities about the role
of the federal government in education. On one hand, A Nation at Risk highlighted
that the United States faced a crisis in education, but on the other hand, Reagan
asserted that the federal government should not intervene in state and local policy
arena.139 The result was a “zig-zag” trajectory between federal activism and
contracted government influence defined by a number of new actors that were not
part of the polity during the 1950s or from 1957-1979. Interest groups found an
opportunity to address voids in education policy that the Reagan Administration did
not fill. Education became increasingly important to all political actors, and each
group had their own variation on how best to solve the “crisis.” Therefore, the
education polity became less of an “iron triangle” and more of a “policy network.”140
In this era from 1980 to 2007, there were an ever-increasing number of interest
groups with a wide-array of goals. Coupling the increase of interest groups with wide
public emphasis on the importance of education, education reform grew more likely
as citizens believed legislative action to be essential to the future success of the
United States.141
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Jesse Rhodes, professor of political science at the University of
Massachusetts, classifies this modern system of influential actors and “institutional
entrepreneurs” into five different groups: business, civil rights, educational liberals,
educational conservatives, and organizations reflecting state-elected officials.142 With
each of these groups, Rhodes dissects where they stood in 2001 on federal
government involvement in education, standards and accountability, federal education
spending, school choice, and block grants and other decentralizing policies. Kaestle
asserts that these different entrepreneurs and policy positions characterized groups
representing public school constituents, issue-focused groups, standards-based reform
groups, school-based reform groups, quasi-governmental groups, multi-issue groups,
foundations, think tanks, intermediary organizations, and for-profit firms.143 While
this list of actors and policies is by no means exhaustive, Rhodes and Kaestle both
highlight the complex relationships and ideologies present in the polity in 2001.
Unlike the interests of the 1950s and 1960s, these groups were no longer
grassroots organizations. Rather, they were professional, ideologically diverse,
Washington-based, heavily dependent on financial contributions, and no longer
needed to target participation to remain in existence. Citizens were not interested in
membership; individuals no longer received important sources of information from
these organizations.144 Technology allowed interest groups to minimize the distance
between the government and people, but also allowed for more polarization,
insulation, and divisions into subgroups based on “topical, religious, or political
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leanings.”145 Given the inclusivity of this environment, the education policy
subsystem strayed from an exclusive network of policy experts; in effect, the new
field of interests created challenges for constructive policy-making. With increased
polarization, research and knowledge were at-risk for bias and inaccuracy. With
increased ideologically-charged interests, congressional subcommittees could be
more easily insulated from important perspectives. Kaestle describes this risk:
“Today, the field of education is more ideologically balanced [than the 1980s and
1990s], but if we wish to enact policies based on evidence, we should be concerned
about an environment that fosters the politicization of education issues, and we
should resist this trend.”146 In this way, the interest group structure during the
formation of No Child Left Behind can both explain some of the content of the
legislation and why it was passed when it did.
As a consequence of this trend, more diverse interests crowded out traditional
education interest groups and researchers in NCLB.147 These traditional groups
included anyone who worked inside a school and the bureaucracy that represented
them (the state departments of education, teachers, teachers’ unions, superintendents,
principals, other administrators, etc.) These interest groups generally advocate for
more funding due to an understanding that 1) they cannot single-handedly change the
lives of students with just good teaching and 2) they cannot compensate for gaps in
achievement without increased funding. These groups are also the strongest
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proponents for Title I funding for traditionally socioeconomically and educationally
disadvantaged students and their schools.148
Elizabeth Debray-Pelot argues that groups representing professional educators
and researchers saw their role diminish and replaced by conservative coalitions
outside of Congress in the legislative process.149 Republicans framed traditional
educational lobbyists as the “status quo” and intentionally excluded them from the
policy formation process.150 While the National Education Association (NEA) was
very powerful in the 1950s and 1960s, as noted above, Congress viewed teachers’
unions as barriers to progress and legislation.151 Teachers unions’ opposed
requirements that teachers be tested to prove their worth as “highly qualified;” the
unions feared that too many teachers would lose their jobs or be fired with such tests.
In effect, the teachers unions hurt themselves by not welcoming a “highly qualified”
standard, championed by Representative George Miller.152 This stance helped
Republicans frame education interests as an ineffectual “status quo.” After 40 years
of education interests influencing policy, achievement gaps and educational inequities
still persisted throughout the United States. Democrats, who traditionally aligned with
teachers unions in particular, were willing to injure their relationship with education
interests to appease civil rights leaders and further the passage of the bill. Using this
rationale, members of Congress could strip education lobbies of their power and rely
on more conservative think tanks and coalitions. 153 For example, the Progressive
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Policy Institute, a centrist Washington-based think tank, was particularly influential
as a legislative agenda setter in both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.154
In addition to the crowding out process due to abundance and diversity of
lobbyists described above, members of the 107th Congress made education interest
groups relatively impotent in two major ways. First, the Bush Administration and its
Domestic Policy Council set the agenda in Congress.155 The Secretary of Education,
Roderick L. Paige, played a limited role in the formation of the law. Instead, the
Domestic Policy Council worked closely with Sandy Kress, President Bush’s
education policy advisor, to develop the agenda. Sarah Youssef, education specialist
on this Council, recalled minimal interference from education interests when she
stated that she could not “ever remember really hitting snags with interest groups…
We weren’t persuaded or pressured by them, and I think that’s partly because they
were already on board with what we wanted to do or they were willing to go along
with.”156 As greater accountability and standards were important and popular parts of
this agenda (inside and outside of Congress) and supported by many education
interests, these lobbyists were reluctant to mobilize against the Bush Administration’s
expedited agenda in these formative stages.157 This early monopoly over the
formulation of the bill almost ensured that many interest groups would be excluded
from policy conversations.

154

Debray-Pelot, “Dismantling Education’s ‘Iron Triangle,’” 68; Rudalevige, “The Politics of
No Child Left Behind,” 64; McGuinn, No Child Left Behind and the Transformation of Federal
Education Policy, 135, 154.
155
Debray-Pelot, “Dismantling Education’s ‘Iron Triangle,’” 79.
156
Ibid. 80
157
Ibid. 80

45
Second, if there was still an opportunity for education interests to have a word
on NCLB, many education interests continued to delay any protests until
objectionable provisions (such as testing mandates) were already part of the final
legislation.158 Members of both parties contributed to this delay by supporting
congressional committee’s efforts to intentionally deny interest groups information
about accountability models and the formation process.159 Debray-Pelot notes that “an
education aide to a House committee Democrat on the conference committee”
recalled being told directly by both Democrats and Republicans, “Don’t talk to
groups. Don’t tell them what’s going on.”160 Realizing he would not meet the
demands of these interests, Senator Kennedy helped champion efforts to shut out
education groups, as lobbyists recall being “read the riot act.” While the NEA was the
most powerful professional union in the United States, a Republican aide reported
that Kennedy “personally called the NEA and demanded that it not oppose the bill;
ultimately, the union took no position on it.”161
In this environment, the interest group structure on the education issue was so
elaborate and diverse that groups could not seek their own independent or
autonomous course of action without running a serious risk of being left out of the
final agreement. This would be particularly true for a group whose size or resources
did not provide sufficient clout to turn negotiations in their favor. Rudalevige
recognizes this trend, noting that the conference for the agreement on the final version
of NCLB included “an astounding 25 conferees” from the Senate “to represent its
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coalitions various blocs.”162 With both African Americans and Latino/as, political
leverage is closely identified with the Democratic Party. As the majority of the
Democratic Party committed its support to the bill, there was less incentive to dissent
from their own coalition. The Democratic Party could take Hispanic interests for
granted to a certain extent, knowing that there was little risk of losing Latino/a
support if they did not deliver on every CHC policy priority. With only 16 voting
members (and two members represented Puerto Rico and Guam), the CHC was also
not in position to garner significant support for an alternative course of action.
Civil Rights and Business Interests: The “Strange Bedfellows Effect”
In the midst of this complex network of interests, civil rights leadership
supported No Child Left Behind and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus allied itself
with these groups. Civil rights interests wanted to close achievement gaps, rid schools
of racist and segregationist policies, and hold schools accountable for decades of
inadequate education of minority students. Business interest groups rallied behind the
legislation to hold the government accountable for the development of the next
generation of productive workers. With support from both of these coalitions on both
sides of the aisle, the Bush Administration and leadership in Congress gained
additional momentum to successfully pass NCLB.
The civil rights interest groups promoted accountability to declare a “no more
nonsense” and “no more excuses” attitude. Deep-seated frustrated drove this “ethos of
accountability;” a strong sense that people were being denied fundamental human
rights propelled the early accountability agenda. During the 1960s and 1970s, civil
rights leaders sought to hold schools and teachers more accountable for their
162
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treatment of African American students. These activists attributed the achievement
gap to racist teachers and schools with low expectations of their students. This
accountability mentality was a reaction to claims made by teachers and school
administrators that African American students were not succeeding solely due to
poverty and the lack of resources in their communities. Viewing this sentiment as an
attack on black culture, civil rights leaders wanted these groups to stop “blaming the
victim for their failure.” In effect, African American civil rights leaders rallied behind
the accountability agenda to improve schools.163 While, in reality, prejudice in
schools and socioeconomic conditions in neighborhoods were not mutually exclusive
and both shaped disadvantages for minority students, these two sides served as
particular sources of conflict between civil rights leaders and school representatives.
Further, civil rights interest groups wanted to document achievement gaps to
systematically hold these schools and teachers accountable. In the decades leading up
to NCLB, the achievement gap was discussed as either an afterthought or as a “dirty
little secret” about the American public education system. Civil rights leaders wanted
to prove that the achievement gap existed and publicize it. This documentation and
publication of the data is a relatively recent phenomenon. Civil rights interests
promoted this transparency to draw urgent attention to achievement gaps. These
efforts for documentation and greater transparency produced standards-based reform
and accountability frameworks.
The civil rights interests also did not necessarily favor the influence of
traditional education interests and helped to shut these groups out from the policymaking process. While reformers and scholars, like Horace Mann and W.E.B.
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DuBois, had viewed the public school system since its conception as a “great
equalizer,” divisions between those who work in schools and civil rights leaders
outside of schools had existed for quite some time.164 Those who work in schools
(teachers, administrators, school boards, departments of education, etc.) have
historically sought to reduce inequality through aiming at larger questions of
socioeconomic disparities. Social science research in the 1960s supported these ideas
by illuminating how educational success is a product of social and economic
conditions beyond the control of schools.165
On the other hand, civil rights groups tended to believe that those who work in
schools caused the problems in education rather than poverty and resource
discrepancies produced outside of school.166 The civil rights accountability
framework developed in the 1960s as black educators, parents, and activists aimed to
hold schools responsible to improve opportunities for African American students who
were often seen by teachers as “uneducable.”167 During the Civil Rights Movement
with efforts to desegregate schools, create compensatory education programs, and
close achievement gaps, the struggle for control and influence in Washington was
very much about who was responsible for educational inequality. While social
scientists and policy-makers highlighted social and cultural causes, black educators
and activists blamed white-run schools rather than the students and surrounding
communities.168
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Within the context of this historical tension, divisions between civil rights
leaders and those who worked in (and represented) schools were still pervasive during
the formation of No Child Left Behind. While education reform is often described as
shifting from “equity to excellence” under President Reagan, the civil rights emphasis
on accountability is an essential component of NCLB as teachers, unions, and
administrators were framed as “excuse-making traditionalists.”169 The name “No
Child Left Behind” itself is borrowed from civil rights rhetoric.170 Therefore, it is not
surprising that civil rights interests sought to shut out education interests when
forming NCLB. Civil rights groups believe education interests were the problem, and
many Democrats agreed.
From the other side of the aisle, business leaders also did not support
education interests. These groups also blamed schools and teachers for educational
deficits as they did not see any improvements in student performance or any “return
on investment” after decades of federal funding. These perspectives on
ineffectiveness augmented the business community’s interest in education. Business
leaders generally have a stake in education to create a new workforce of highlytrained and well-educated youth. Business leaders were interested in outcomes and
hard data of performance, too. They wanted to determine where the government spent
its revenue and determine the effectiveness of federal government involvement in
education.
Further, the accountability framework in No Child Left Behind was a
manifestation of market-based ideologies. By identifying which schools are
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succeeding and failing, there would theoretically be a higher demand for the “good”
schools and “good” programs and reduced demand for poor-performing schools.
Low-achieving schools would be punished based on their failure to make adequate
yearly progress (AYP) and money would be rewarded to schools that innovate.
NCLB gives students the option to leave schools that are failing and in effect, aimed
to drive poor schools “out of business.” Test scores are the functional equivalent of
profit in this analogy. As such, the competition between schools theoretically would
spur innovation as advanced performers would rise and failures would be eliminated.
Business leaders pushed the accountability narrative throughout the 1990s, but
found themselves frustrated with President Clinton and anti-intervention Republicans
in Washington. State governments were often uninterested as well, but business
leaders found success with rising Republican George W. Bush to adopt their agenda
in Texas. This connection was deeply rooted in Texas politics.171 Bush used his
experiences in Texas to augment his presidential campaign and shared both
ideologies and personnel with the Texas business community while President.172
Without much focus on relatively impotent educational conservatives who resisted a
greater role of federal government, Bush could focus on the accountability and testing
that lay at the heart of the business interests’ agenda.
During the same time, civil rights groups (under the leadership of individuals
like Kati Haycock, Phyllis McClure, David Hornbeck, William Taylor, and Dianne
Piché) also tried to revamp support for federal initiatives on standards and
accountability. Following the “Republican Revolution” of 1994, Education Trust in

171
172

Rhodes, An Education in Politics, 138.
Ibid. 139

51
particular worked to garner strong support beyond traditional reformers in the
Democratic Party. Republicans, especially those susceptible to business interests,
could support the civil rights’ accountability models which were closely connected to
the models used in Texas.173 At the same time, civil rights leadership sponsored
significant research projects; in some cases, this research aimed to provoke policymakers in Washington, “charging that their unwillingness to support federal
standards-based reform was directly responsible for the low achievement of
disadvantaged students.”174
Civil rights entrepreneurs wanted to provide concrete evidence that standardsbased reforms would reduce achievement gaps, improve overall student achievement,
and should be a priority in Congress.175 For example, the Citizens Commission for
Civil Rights’ Report Title I in Mainstream argued that public education has failed
since the conception of Title I because reform did not accompany an increase in
funding. In another example, Education Trust conducted a survey of 1200 highperforming schools serving concentrations of poor and minority students in 1998.
This research was used to validate accountability and standards-based reform.176
While there were other reports released by a number of other organizations, this
evidence helped convince some educators and more importantly, Democratic
members of Congress, to support such reform. Democrats believed that alliances with
the civil rights leaders could provide electoral and political advantages. Jesse Rhodes
notes that for these reasons, “Even Bush’s close advisor Sandy Kress has called civil
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rights entrepreneurs the ‘intellectual fathers of NCLB’ for their advocacy of policy
provisions.”177
Rhodes highlights the significance of the “strange bedfellows effect” by
describing the ways in which civil rights and business coalition could accomplish
progress that others could not:
Whereas educational liberals and educational conservatives again pursued
divisive reform strategies, featuring, on the one hand, expanded spending, and
on the other, various measures to promote private school choice and
regulatory reform, business entrepreneurs and civil rights entrepreneurs
attracted both Republicans and Democrats to their cause by crafting appeals
that resonated across the partisan divide.178
The joint efforts of civil rights leaders and business leaders brought different groups
together across the ideological spectrum. With such a strong coalition, including
those which represented their own interests, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus
supported No Child Left Behind. These interest group dynamics worked together with
the electoral and Congressional politics of 2001 to create advantageous conditions for
the passage of NCLB.
Rational Calculations: Theories of Congressional Decision-making
Carl F. Kaestle, Lee Anderson, and Andrew Rudalevige all argue that
ideological weakening among conservatives and increased diversity of interest groups
produce “unpredictable behavior” among legislators. While these authors accurately
recognize that members of Congress did not necessarily vote in a manner that appears
consistent with historical party positions or traditional party ideologies, the voting
behavior of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus was predictable based on standard
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theories of Congressional decision-making and the role of party in these theories. To
understand this possibility, it is useful to note that there is a paradoxical element in
the relationship between party and ideology in the analysis of NCLB. While an
“ideological weakening” among Republicans made the passage of NCLB possible,
President Bush and Congressional Republicans still embraced policy positions that
were motivated by party allegiance with an eye towards a longer-term ideological
agenda.
The movement towards a federal role in the national educational system –one
that emphasized accountability in the expenditure of federal funds rather than simply
expanding funding – has already been described as an opportunity to seek partisan
advantage and attract voters on a popular policy issue that historically favored the
Democrats. Yet, while the more favorable Republican position on a federal role in
education might be seen as a moment of “ideological weakening,” the emphasis on
accountability allowed the Republicans to maintain a position that was ideologically
compatible with an emphasis on fiscal responsibility. At the same time, Republicans
and President Bush could exploit this initiative for partisan advantage in pursuit of the
conservative agenda. Indeed, it is the contention of this analysis that the Democrats’
willingness to work with the Bush Administration on NCLB was partially in
recognition that partisan advantage was at stake. As such, the “process of ideological
weakening” discussed above should be understood as an element of the education
policy debate specifically, but should not be misperceived as a signal that
partisan/ideological divisions between the parties had been significantly diminished
overall.

54
With this in mind, John W. Kingdon’s framework for Congressional agenda
setting and voting decisions can be applied to the formation of No Child Left Behind
as a mechanism to explain how the law passed. This framework illuminates that No
Child Left Behind emerged on the agenda in 2001 due to a specific convergence of
factors that persuaded the Congressional Hispanic Caucus to vote in favor of the law.
When put in the context of institutional changes in Congress (particularly in the
House of Representatives), Kingdon’s work further helps explain the importance of
party influence in 2001 and how party leadership directed the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus to support NCLB.
In his 1984 book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, John W.
Kingdon presents a framework to analyze and comprehend public policy agendasetting. His work primarily aims to explain the decision-making processes of the
“political branches” (Congress and the Presidency) of the federal government.179 The
expansion of the federal government in the 20th century structured contemporary
public policy in such a way that Congress and the President have substantial authority
and liberty to set the agenda. These branches of the federal government are far more
influential over the public policy agenda than the “nonpolitical branches” (the federal
judiciary and the executive bureaucracy).180 Even given these power dynamics,
members of Congress and their staffs, the White House, lobbyists, the media,
executive bureaucrats, and state-level representatives propose thousands of issues and
respective solutions in public policy debates each year. Amid of this network of
interests, problems, and new alternatives, only a few issues (or less) come into the
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spotlight in each session of Congress. Even further, it is much more likely that
Congress will slightly revise existing legislation than endeavor to shift to entirely new
policies. 181
Kingdon argues that a public policy issue becomes part of an agenda on rare
occasions when there is a confluence of “three streams:” the problem stream, the
policy stream, and the political stream.182 The problem stream is defined as “matters
of concern that a critical mass of people want to change or affect.”183 These problems
can arise from a variety of factors, such as disasters or tragic events, the culmination
of small concerns that reach a critical mass, or on-going outcry from the public and
media about an issue. The policy stream consists of the ideas floating around,
“bumping into one another, encountering new ideas, and forming combinations and
re-combinations” of policy alternatives.184 Information on policy problems and
proposals on how to fix them can originate from academics, policy experts, singleissue interests, think tanks, and others. The number and diversity of proposals are vast
and are often only limited by interest, time, and energy.185 The political stream
comprises “electoral, partisan, and pressure group factors” and is primarily defined by
changes in the national mood (public opinion), presidential administrations, or
majority parities in Congress.186 The defeat/victory or retirement/rise of influential
and charismatic legislators can also contribute to a redefined political stream. The
actors in each of these streams could theoretically be involved in all of the streams
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simultaneously, but it is more common for actors to be part in one or two of the
streams.187 When these three streams converge, a public policy issue gains enough
momentum to be prioritized on the agenda, discussed with action in mind, and
addressed by the government in the form of new public policies.188 This model has
been applied to a variety of federal policy fields, both by Kingdon himself and other
scholars.
Kingdon’s framework can be applied to NCLB to further understand why and
how education reform became an agenda priority in 2001. The problem stream, the
policy stream, and the political stream all converged to allow for passage. The public
at large created and reinforced the problem stream: almost all Americans wanted to
address education issues at the turn of the century. The interest group activity
described above represents the policy stream. Education reformers were abundant and
diverse, each with slightly different strategies to address achievement gaps. The late
1990s and early 2000s were crowded with policy proposals. Finally, these interest
groups, President Bush, and the “Big Four” in Congress satisfied the political stream
in the formation of NCLB. The political stream was also cultivated by the perception
of public salience on the issue. As all of Kingdon’s streams are satisfied in the above
analysis, No Child Left Behind passed due to the confluence of an important problem,
valid and abundant policy alternatives, and the political actors ready to accomplish
reform.
Furthermore, Kingdon’s scholarship illuminates the rationale behind
Congressional voting decisions on No Child Left Behind. Kingdon’s Integrative
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Model of Legislative Voting Decisions (Figure 1 below) reveals that members of
Congress assess a variety of forces when determining how to vote. An inventory of
these forces can be seen in Figure 1 below. When considering this list of forces,
Kingdon asserts that members of Congress will evaluate where their forces coincide
and where they conflict. If there is no conflict, the member will vote with the
consensus of their forces (noncontroversial decisions). If there is a conflict, the
Congressperson must weigh the varying forces against each other to determine his or
her vote. At any point in this calculation, a particular answer to any of the questions
on Kingdon’s Figure 1 may be controlling and direct a Congressperson to vote based
on that variable. Kingdon argues that members of Congress generally prioritize
variables in the order he features in his flow chart.
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Kingdon’s Integrative Model of Legislative Voting Decisions is informative
in two primary ways. First, Kingdon provides an inventory of variables that one
needs to consider when evaluating why members of Congress vote on the floor as
they do. Second, Kingdon’s framework allows non-policy experts to understand that
there is a standard voting calculus where the weight of different variables depends on
the particular circumstances. Within the above framework, the Congressional
Hispanic Caucus did not have a conflict in their field of forces due to the particular
political environment in 2001, as described in the previous section. Particularly, the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s political party and powerful lobbies supported the
legislation. Therefore, the decision of the CHC can be understood in the following
way:
A: Is it non-controversial? → No
↓
B: Is there a conflict among actors in my field of forces? → NO → Vote with
my field.
As all of the major actors in the CHC’s field were in favor of the legislation, the CHC
would logically vote with their field of forces.190
While Kingdon’s model helps explain the CHC’s voting decisions on NCLB,
it is important to consider a few factors that supplement the above analysis. First,
Kingdon’s work was first published in 1977 (with the most recent edition in 1989)
and Congress has changed in numerous ways since this time. Kingdon’s work was
heavily influenced by David Mayhew’s Congress: The Electoral Connection. In this

190

John W. Kingdon, “Models of Legislative Voting,” The Journal of Politics 39, no. 3
(1977): 575, accessed September 15, 2014, http://faculty.washington.edu/jwilker/353/kingdon.pdf.

60
1974 canonical text, Mayhew argued that the desire for reelection was the principle
variable explaining Congressional voting behavior.191 Hence, constituencies were the
most important influence on these decisions and members of Congress needed to
focus most on constituent services and policy preferences. As Mayhew’s theories
dominated analysis on Congressional decision-making, Kingdon’s model reflects the
importance of reelection as a motivating variable.
Second, Kingdon wrote in the context of a long-standing Democraticallycontrolled Congress (1932-1992) which included a number of “solid South”
conservative Democrats. In this environment, political party determined
Congressional member behavior to a lesser extent, particularly in the House of
Representatives, than in 2001. Instead, power was much more decentralized with
significant control in committees with committee chairs setting the agenda. In this
environment, logrolling and bargaining were the norm, as manifest in Kingdon’s
model above at step “D.” Steven S. Smith and Gerald Gamm, writing on The
Dynamics of Party Government in Congress, describe a decentralized pattern as “the
central party leader defers to committee chairs, performs the ministerial duty of
scheduling, and, as circumstances require, bargains with influential members.”192
These dynamics in Congress have changed significantly since the 1970s. The
party variable is not explicitly included in Kingdon’s Integrative Model of Legislative
Voting Decisions. In the contemporary political environment, the party variable can
be found in a number of steps. Step “D” is particularly important as the positions of
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“fellow” members of Congress “of major importance” have come to be defined as the
positions of the Democratic and Republican parties. In the same vein, party
allegiances often define the components of step C that focus on Presidential behavior.
While the CHC found little conflict in their “field of forces” (step B) and did not
reach steps C or D, the party variable was still a large component of a Congress
person’s “field of forces.” Therefore, by placing Kingdon in a contemporary context,
party allegiances and inter-party conflicts augment an understanding of the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s support for No Child Left Behind.193
The realignment of the South after President Richard Nixon’s election
substantially altered Congressional politics and partisanship. After overwhelming
support for the Democratic Party since the Civil War, conservative Southerners began
to move away from the Democratic Party in response to the Republicans’ “Southern
strategy” for electoral advantages. Increasingly facing fewer constraints from
Southern conservatives who were defecting to the Republican Party, liberal
Democrats strengthened the powers of party leadership to promote more partisan
politics in the early 1970s.194 These changes were further advanced by Reagan’s
elections and the rise of Newt Gingrich and his cohort in the 1980s. This shift was
institutionally solidified through the “Republican Revolution” of 1994. By the
formation of No Child Left Behind in 2001, conservative Southern Democrats were
not a factor in the same way as they had been in the middle of the 20th century.195
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Therefore, there was more “intra-party cohesion” and homogeneity as well as more
“inter-party conflict” than seen from 1932 to 1972.
Political scientists now associate these conditions with the term “conditional
party government” (CPG), which suggests that the American political system might
move toward something more closely resembling the operations of a parliamentary
system such as those in Europe. Coined by David W. Rhode, the conditional party
government thesis argues that Congress can be organized around strong party
leadership and cohesion. These conditions arise when parties are highly polarized and
led by assertive and powerful party leaders. Party polarization is a product of
polarized elections, where the electorate supports candidates with strong partisan
views.196 Further, charismatic leaders can contribute to intra-party cohesion, as they
can independently play a role in shaping and reinforcing party behavior. Proponents
of CPG theories argue that members of Congress are more likely to concede power to
party leaders in these contexts. Consequently, conditional party government is
associated with the declining power of committee chairs, increased party control over
committee assignments (as opposed to norms of seniority), and enhanced power of
the Speaker of the House over the House Rules Committee chair.197
Smith and Gamm recognize the years just before 2000 as one of the “eras of
high party polarization” in which the conditional party government thesis can be used
to understand Congressional behavior.198 While strong majority party leadership did
not develop in the Senate, both parties in the House were characterized by influential
central leadership. This CPG structure emerged with the success of the “Republican
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Revolution” in 1994. Part of this success was the nationalization of congressional
races with the Republicans’ ten-point policy platform, the “Contract with
America.”199 Republicans had a strong consciousness of a national agenda. For the
first time in at least 40 years, the Republican Party had renewed urgency and
momentum to further conservative policy priorities.
To secure this agenda, Republicans allocated additional powers to party
leadership (as Democrats had done in the early 1970s) in two major ways. First,
Republicans authorized the Speaker of the House to appoint all of the majority party
members of the powerful Rules Committee; this committee determines the length of
floor debates and can effectively freeze out the minority party from offering any
amendments. These actions suggest great intraparty cohesion, as rank-and-file
Republicans were willing to allow the Rules committee to become an arm of the party
leadership. As members of Congress saw their electoral fortunes closely tied to their
party’s success, each member of Congress was more likely to try to control any
outliers that deviated from the party position and could undermine the ability of that
position to prevail. Hence, members of Congress supported the party leaders rather
than defecting and risking less electoral support.200
Second, Republican leadership discontinued the standard of seniority as the
sole means of appointing committee chairs. With Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the
House, Republicans “handpicked full committee chairs, who were later endorsed by
the party conference, and picked several subcommittee chairs, who were then
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appointed by committee chairs.”201 In most cases, the most senior Republican
occupied these chairs, but the message was established that party was more important
than seniority. As with the Rules Committee dynamics, the rank-and-file Republican
members acquiesced to the leadership. In this way, the Republicans worked to
establish intraparty homogeneity to secure their agenda.
With this intraparty cohesion characterizing Republicans, the Democrats
followed suit in escalating their partisan behavior. The impeachment of Bill Clinton
accelerated a sense of interparty conflict. The Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report charts “party unity scores” in both the House of Representatives and the
Senate. According to these scores, both Republican and Democratic “party unity
scores” in both Chambers were at an all-time high somewhere between 1995 and
2008. In the House specifically, Republicans were most unified in 1995, 2001, and
2003, while Democratic unity steadily increased throughout the 1990s and early
2000s to peak in 2007-2008.202 Democratic homogeneity may not have reached the
levels of cohesion of the Republican Party in the 1990s and early 2000s due to
President Bill Clinton’s “trianglarization” strategy. President Clinton gained electoral
advantages by positing himself as a centrist voice in between conservative
Republicans and liberal Democrats. With two sides of this “triangle” in the
Democratic Party, the Democrats were not as unified as Republicans and
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Congressional Democrats had slightly different policy priorities than President
Clinton.203
Anticipating a close election in 2000, both parties recognized a need to
discipline potential defectors within their parties and ensure party unity. Conditional
party government in this era reached its pinnacle with the election of George W. Bush
in 2000. The federal government became increasingly “unified” with a Republican
president; this cohesion augmented the Republican agenda and mediated against one
of the constitutional sources of potential institutional conflict – the separation of
powers. Hence, the conditions in 2000 were favorable for conditional party
government and party leadership was an exceptionally strong determinant of
Congressional behavior during the formation of No Child Left Behind. In effect,
voters had a high-degree of confidence that a party label was indicative of a voting
cue.
Conditional party government theories have partially fallen out of favor with
political science communities and are not necessarily the mainstream in 2014 due to
more recent factors. The conditions that favored CPG could not be maintained for two
primary reasons. First, the unpopularity of the war in Iraq reintroduced divided
government in 2006 with the rise of Democrats in Congress. At the same time, the
Iraq war turned public opinion against the Bush Administration. In effect, the national
conservative agenda grew less homogeneous as the priorities of a Republican
president did not lead to re-election for many Congressional Republicans. Second, the
financial crisis, bank bailouts, the election of Barack Obama, the stimulus package,

203

2014.

John Reynolds (Professor at Moravian College) in discussion with the author, November,

66
and the Affordable Health Care Act mobilized more ideologically extreme
conservative voters. These positions became manifest in the Tea Party’s success in
Congressional elections. The Occupy Wall Street Movement had a similar, but less
electorally successful, impact on the Left. These more polarized positions proved to
be a source of conflict with established leaders within both parties. The level of
intraparty homogeneity dropped even as the level of interparty conflict remained
high. Therefore, the CPG thesis became less dominant in the years after 2001, but
adequately explains the political environment during the formation of NCLB.
To bring these ideas of conditional party government and party control back to
Kingdon, his “Integrative Model” only includes party implicitly in a number of steps.
By NCLB in 2001, the importance of party leadership suggests that party variables
fundamentally characterized the “field of forces” section (in ways unseen in 1977
when Kingdon first developed his framework). The “field of forces” can be found in
step B of Kingdon’s model (B: Is there a conflict among actors in my field of
forces?). The behavior of party leadership had become more frequently and more
stridently controlling, presenting individual members with a strong indicator of the
convergence of different decision-making variables. This was particularly true of the
Republicans under Newt Gingrich, and generally continued under Dennis Hastert,
making party a controlling factor in defining the field of forces.204 Following suit,
new, strong Democratic leadership held close ranks to counter this rising Republican
unity. Given that the Republicans were still ascendant in 2001 and that the Democrats
feared losing control of the education issue, Kingdon’s model would lead one to
expect the CHC to vote with their “field of forces” on NCLB. In this way, the
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Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s support for NCLB can be further understood within
the context of mainstream theories of Congressional decision-making.
A Matter of Pros and Cons: Recognizing Progress and Shortcomings
Apart from the advantageous political context and the theories of
Congressional decision-making, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s support of No
Child Left Behind can be understood through the statements of members of the CHC
itself. There is little scholarship on the role of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus or
Latino/a interests in the formation of No Child Left Behind, so I explored the role of
Latino/as through a variety of resources: the text of the No Child Left Behind
legislation; publications by the two most often cited Hispanic interest groups, the
National Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund; a series of conversations with interest group representatives,
scholars, former policy-makers, and school district representatives; and the
Congressional Record, including speeches of members of the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus. Through this research, it became evident that the members of the CHC
recognized the shortfalls in the legislation, but voted for the bill anyway due to
certain gains for Latino/a students. Furthermore, the problems raised by the CHC in
the formation process were only anticipated. Legislators could not have been able to
predict the ways in which NCLB would fail Latino/a students with the information
available at the time of passage.
The text of No Child Left Behind includes a variety of elements that the CHC
found desirable, and hence, provided incentives to vote for the law. While speeches
from members of the CHC in the Congressional Record about No Child Left Behind
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are sparse, limited archives inform us about the evolution of the CHC’s support. To
best represent the views of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, we can look how the
chair of the CHC, Silvestre Reyes (Texas-D), showed his support for No Child Left
Behind in the Congressional Record on December 13, 2001. Reyes highlights
significant elements of the law that he genuinely believed would reduce disparities in
performance between Latino/a students and their non-Hispanic White peers.205 As
many Hispanic students depend on quality English language learning programs for
success, Reyes primarily focuses on provisions within Title III of NCLB, “Language
Instruction for Limited English Proficient and Immigrant Students.” While a
definitive departure from the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, this 35-page section of
the legislation provides means to improve English language instruction for LEP
students and illuminates the primary reasons for the CHC’s support of NCLB.
First of all, Reyes backs formula-based bilingual education funding rather
than a grant-based system, stating “This new formula, accompanied by a significant
increase in appropriations, will extend bilingual education to millions of eligible
students who currently do not receive bilingual education services.”206 Reyes echoes
concerns about appropriate funding made by his colleague, Representative Ciro D.
Rodriguez (Texas-D), on the floor of Congress on June 19, 2001. Rodriguez
highlighted his support of the formula to which Reyes refers, as school districts would
receive funds directly rather than through the state bureaucracies. Rodriguez also
applauded No Child Behind’s increased financial commitment to education,
specifically through Title I funding. Furthermore, Rodriguez was pleased that
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provisions for vouchers and school privatization were left out of NCLB.207 In these
ways, with special attention paid to bilingual education funding, the CHC supported
No Child Left Behind’s efforts to allot revenue to serve Latino/a students in
meaningful ways.
Following the theme of bilingual education services, Reyes also supported the
ability of families to “opt-out” of bilingual education programs if parents preferred to
place their child in an English-only curriculum.208 Supporting an ability to “opt-out”
of bilingual programs may appear unusual, but this sentiment was consistent with
civil rights priorities and fears of historical discrimination. Victoria MacDonald of the
University of Maryland noted in conversation with the author that before NCLB,
many students never graduated from English as a Second Language programs and
never advanced to more academically challenging classes. Stuck in segregated
classrooms, Latino/a students often received inadequate resources to grow
academically. This trend was part of the motivation for Proposition 227 in California
that banned bilingual education in 1998. There was, and remains, a perception that
bilingual programs were “ghetto-ized,” never prompted improvement, and removed
students from ambitious peers. Indeed, the departure from support for bilingual
education was partially in recognition of poorly executed and underfunded
programs.209 In effect, efforts to allow students the choice to leave bilingual programs
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were a consequence of inadequate services and rare graduation from these services in
the years prior to NCLB.210
These same concerns need to be considered to understand why the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus objected to NCLB’s three-year maximum limit on
enrollment in English learning programs “regardless of what level of English
proficiency [students] reach.”211 The CHC recognized that students enter the
educational system at different stages in the process of acquiring language and
students should be able to stay in bilingual education as long as appropriate.212
However, the CHC conceded on this issue for much the same reasons that they
supported the “opt-out” provision. Given the trends described above, a three-year
maximum was a manifestation of the fear that LEP students were segregated into
bilingual or ESL programs too long. Students continued to be caught in between
needing English learning classes and more academically challenging integrated
courses. In this vein, there was a civil rights imperative to accelerate English
language learners into more advanced college preparation, honors, and Advanced
Placement classes. Finally, with a dramatic increase in the Latino/a population, many
schools grappled with capacity issues; space, funding, and other resources were
limited in English language learning programs. As such, schools felt pressure to
“move students in and move students out” as quickly as possible.213 Therefore, while
the CHC rationally opposed the three-year maximum, this provision was created to
address concerns that the CHC considered valid.
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Reyes’s arguments about accountability aligned the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus with civil rights leaders and African American interests in support of similar
measures. The CHC agreed with civil rights leaders at the time about the effects of
discriminatory practices within schools on student achievement. Reyes highlighted
that No Child Left Behind tests English language learners after three years to reflect
school performance, but not the achievement of individual students. The National
Council of La Raza also recognized the testing agreements in NCLB as a positive for
Hispanic students because students could be tested “in the language and form most
likely to yield accurate results for ELLs.”214 School-wide accountability measures
aimed to ensure that bilingual programs remained effective. Therefore, Reyes
supported NCLB’s efforts to ensure that schools were doing their part to close
achievement gaps. 215
Attached to the issue of accountability and civil rights interests, the CHC
wanted the federal government to recognize that Hispanic students were
underperforming and make closing the achievement gap a national priority. Melissa
Lazarín, Managing Director of Education Policy at the Center for American Progress
and former staffer at the National Council of La Raza, specified that NCLR supported
No Child Left Behind because it radically changed how Latino/a students would be
considered in schools and held schools accountable for student progress.216 Lazarín
also noted that no one expected NCLB to solve all problems in the U.S. education
system, but rather, it was important to know how best to respond after the
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achievement gap was documented.217 While standardized testing was not a perfect
measure of intelligence or acquisition of knowledge, measuring the achievement gap
allowed the CHC to highlight achievement discrepancies, attract alarm, and provoke
action. MacDonald noted that some schools would encourage Latino/a students to
stay home during important tests to avoid low scores and ignore discrepancies in
achievement. Through email correspondence, Patricia Gandara of the Civil Rights
Project at UCLA, too, emphasized the significance of the federal government tracking
data on how English learners were faring rather than ignoring or hiding these
statistics. 218 With this as the alternative, the CHC viewed testing in No Child Left
Behind as a positive development, as schools and governments of all levels could
more confidently measure achievement of all students.219
Reyes championed NCLB’s inclusion of professional development provisions
to improve the caliber of existing teachers and train new ones qualified to teach
English language learners.220 These efforts for highly-qualified instructors were
coupled with efforts to improve second language acquisition pedagogy in general.
Research on the best way to serve ELL students was inconclusive, with programs
highly dependent on the priorities of each district and the resources available to
schools.221 Title III of NCLB contained provisions to improve language instruction
through evidence-based research. The legislation required that this research apply for
teachers that were unfamiliar with the language of the LEP student. Research was
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also to be “administered by individuals with expertise in second language
acquisition” and should include considerations of “the needs of limited English
proficient children and their families.”222 Language in the legislation recognized that
research on English language acquisition was inadequate and inconclusive and
supported further investigation on how to teach LEP students, giving the CHC
incentive to support NCLB.
Further, Title III prescribed developing a common definition of “limited
English proficient” child for purposes of national data collection. Joe Leaf, ESL
coordinator at the highly-Latino/a populated Norristown School District in
Norristown, Pennsylvania, recognized the importance of a standard definition for
“English language proficient.” While the definition of LEP varies slightly from state
to state, districts must now test yearly to judge English proficiency and use listening,
speaking, reading, and writing in both social and academic contexts to adequately
measure the true proficiency of a student.223 Before creating a standard definition, too
many LEP students would perform below grade level without teachers realizing it or
teachers would permit substandard work due to language challenges. No Child Left
Behind wanted to ensure that students were challenged academically in age
appropriate ways regardless of a student’s first language. In many cases, teachers
would arbitrarily judge when students were ready to progress into more demanding
classes or grade levels. While NCLB could not guarantee that teachers would be
adequately prepared to judge sufficient language development, refined definitions of
“limited English proficient” helped create a standard to track language acquisition.
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Furthermore, new standardized tests and progress reports would allow for national
consistency. The “WIDA” (World-class Instructional Design and Assessment) exam
is particularly popular, as these scores can follow students from district to district.224
Reyes emphasized the importance of migrant education services, particularly efforts
to transfer education and health records, because many Latino/a American families
(especially recent immigrants) moved to multiple locations across the U.S.225 For this
reason, standardized tests and definitions allowed for districts to judge capacity and
progress and find adequate placements for LEP students.
With all of these considerations, members of the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus supported No Child Left Behind for a series of victories (small and large)
while understanding that the bill had high aspirations that might not be achieved as
expected. While Reyes’s comments above suggest a resolute conviction, his colleague
in the CHC, Ciro D. Rodriguez, draws attention to a less definitive stance only
months earlier. In a speech mentioned above on June 19, 2001, Rodriguez referred to
a March letter to President Bush from Congressman Reyes and Congressman Ruben
Hinojosa, as Chair of the CHC and Chair of the CHC Education Task Force
respectively, voicing the CHC's opposition to a series of NCLB provisions.226
Members of the CHC definitively predicted shortcomings in No Child Left Behind,
but decided to support the legislation anyway.
Representative Ciro D. Rodriguez (Texas-D) gave his speech on the House
floor, entitled “Ensuring that No Child Left Behind Requires More,” in which he both
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applauded NCLB for the reasons listed above and anticipated substantial problems for
Latino/a Americans. Rodriguez was alarmed by failures to address class size
reduction, school construction and renovation, and sufficient financial support for
testing. The reliance on tests was a particular cause for alarm. Rodriguez noted that
the National Assessment of Education Progress, the so-called “nation’s report card,”
did not administer tests in Spanish. While LEP students could complete tests in the
language which would produce the most accurate results for their first three years of
assessment, LEP students would continue to struggle with English after this time
period and tests in English would produce inaccurate results. Furthermore, he
worried about NCLB’s consolidation of bilingual, immigrant, and foreign language
education into one single formula grant. Like Reyes, Rodriguez was concerned by an
“arbitrary” three-year limit on bilingual education programs. In contrast to Reyes’s
sentiments only months later, however, Rodriguez feared that families would need to
“opt-in” to receive bilingual education services rather than receiving automatic
placements, creating cumbersome burdens on families and school districts.227 Overall,
Rodriguez highlighted the diversity and skills of Latino/as that could not fit into a
“one-size-fits-all” piece of legislation.228
Moreover, members of Congress, specifically members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, generally supported the bill with reservations about its effectiveness as
a piece of civil rights legislation. On December 11, 2001, Representative Major R.
Owens (New York-D) foreshadowed debates over funding, stating:
We trivialize education. We do not make it a high priority except in terms of
rhetoric. The highest priority items receive the greatest portion of the budget.
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There is a correlation between appropriations and priorities in Congress, and
we are not in the same place that American people are. They would like to
have us do far more.229
On the same day, Representative Carolyn C. Kilpatrick (Michigan-D) echoed these
concerns about funding with her comments:
However, as I do rise in support of this bill, it is not without reservation. In a
year where the President and Congress have pledged to “leave no child
behind,” we unfortunately do not fulfill this commitment to those children
with special education needs. Congress needs to make funding for special
education mandatory, so that schools, teachers, and students with special
education needs will have the tools they need to perform successfully.
Congress also needs to provide more funding in the years ahead, to ensure that
our nation’s public schools are able to meet the requirements laid out in this
bill and face the challenges ahead of them.230
Despite such anticipated funding shortfalls for traditionally underserved students,
members of Congress representing both the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and the
Congressional Black Caucus decided to vote for NLCB.
These shortcomings illuminate complex calculations made by members of the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus in 2001. While anticipating inadequacies early in the
formation process, the CHC supported NCLB and its potential victories for Hispanic
students in the final vote. This decision was partially a product of the fact that the
anticipated problems were just that- anticipated. These problems had not come to
fruition yet. Even if critics of No Child Left Behind proved to be correct about the
legislation’s failure to deliver on promises, members of the CHC could reasonably
return home to their districts with some benefits to distribute to constituents. With
these benefits, the CHC could blame the failure to substantially improve conditions
229
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on others in Congress and in Washington. Additionally, if members of the CHC failed
to be involved at all, they would risk losing the victories that they did gain and
conditions might have been even worse for constituents. Therefore, the CHC voted
for NCLB with the expectations that the law would help their constituencies and
augment their own electoral advantages.
There are a number of major ways in which members of the CHC could not
have anticipated the extent or severity of No Child Left Behind’s ineffectiveness. The
CHC and many other supporters of the law underestimated the potential for
implementation failures. Issues during the formation of NCLB that could not be
resolved were postponed to the implementation process. As such, NCLB did not
contain sufficient enforcement provisions to ensure all of the reforms it contained
would be executed in practice. Furthermore, federal funding for NCLB mandates was
projected to be substantially higher. Finally, Texas-style accountability measures
appeared to be an effective reform at the times of passage, but in fact, the Bush
Administration exaggerated their successes in Texas to gain political support. Texasstyle accountability has subsequently proven to be deeply flawed for Latino/a
students.231 The confusion about the quality of Texas-style accountability reflects a
void in research on best practices in education generally. Regardless of the severity of
these deficiencies, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus could not have predicted the
stalemate in Congress in recent years that would make it virtually impossible to pass
further revisions and reauthorizations. While the CHC could anticipate some
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problems in NCLB, these members of Congress would not have been able to predict a
number of major deficiencies with the information they possessed at the time.
Linda Darling-Hammond, Diane Ravitch, John Chubb, and many other
leading voices in the education field have explored the implementation process
through extensive scholarship. The successes and failures of implementation are the
beyond the purview of my analysis, but a brief description of this process can partly
illuminate why the CHC expected No Child Left Behind to be more effective at
reducing achievement gaps. No Child Left Behind failed to be implemented
successfully for two major reasons: a lack of enforcement provisions and insufficient
funding. First, for political reasons no doubt, many specific directives and
enforcement provisions were written out of the law to facilitate passage. Andrew
Rudalevige notes the exceptional compromise in 2001; Democrats and Republicans
came together in support of provisions in No Child Left Behind that they
fundamentally disagreed about one session of Congress earlier. To resolve these
disputes, key issues were often postponed until implementation. As is often the case
with such omnibus bills, specifics were compromised and deferred from “campaign to
committee to floor to conference to implementation.”232 After NCLB passed, it
remained to be seen how the Department of Education and its enforcement practices
would consider the requirements of state and local actors.233
Rudalevige describes the final bill as “at once numbingly detailed and
comfortably vague.”234 To reduce objections and ease passage, NCLB was written
with just enough ambiguity to satisfy members of Congress. This ambiguity proved to
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be problematic during implementation. For example, states and local districts were
ultimately given wide discretion on accountability provisions. Republicans in
Congress resisted efforts to define accountability measures for the states. Instead, the
text of the law left states to determine their own standards, definitions of proficiency,
and assessment measures. This flexibility permitted states the opportunity to lower
expectations to receive increased funding or avoid pressure from the federal
government.235 Vague provisions made the Department of Education’s role in
implementation a determinative factor in the success of the policy. While the DOE
and Secretary of Education could hold firm to NCLB’s commitments, the text of the
bill and the narrow powers of the federal bureaucracy in general limited the ability to
enforce NCLB’s mandates.236 This ambiguity reduced the effectiveness of NCLB, as
overarching reforms became eroded in practice.
The lack of enforcement provisions became particularly important for the
testing of Latino/a and ELL students. While NCLB allowed for testing in native
languages for up to three years, there was little in the legislation to enforce this
clause. Many states did not want to create tests in the languages of all the children
within their jurisdiction due to high costs and administrative demands. 237 According
to Bender et al., only fourteen states made accommodations for LEP students in their
state assessment systems.238 In a number of key court cases, state and federal courts
have ruled that NCLB does not require accommodations for English language
learners. In Reading School District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education
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(2004), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that NCLB does not mandate that
states must provide testing accommodations for LEP students. Rather, the legislation
only requires accommodations be provided “to the extent practicable.”239 While states
are increasing alternative tests for LEP students, this case specified that
accommodations are neither mandated by NCLB nor a necessary part of state
legislation.240
Subsequently, Horne v. Flores in 2009 undermined the potential political
clout of NCLB. In contrast to the Lau decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
decisions of lower courts in Horne v. Flores and found minimal resources and
standards permissible for the education of English language learners. This decision
was viewed as a huge setback for Latino/as nationally, as the largest population of
ELLs is Latino/a.241 As the CHC could not have predicted this setback, these
members of Congress may have anticipated that NCLB could produce more change in
the years after its implementation.
Second, the implementation process failed to be effective primarily due to
insufficient funding. President Bush simultaneously cut taxes while waging war in the
Middle East in his first term. These expenditures diverted funds way from NLCB’s
implementation and execution. Eugene Garcia noted in a phone conversation with the
author that the federal government only provided 40 dollars per student with the
formula changes for English language learner resources.242
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After passing with overwhelming bipartisan support only six months earlier,
prominent members of Congress started to shift their support for NCLB due to
inadequate funding. On June 18th, 2002, Senator Harry Reid (Nevada-D) spoke
directly about education for Hispanic and limited English proficient youth and No
Child Left Behind. Reid drew attention to NCLB’s “catchy name,” but reprimanded
President Bush for not backing up “his rhetoric with the resources our children
need.”243 Reid continued, “Just 1 month after signing educational reform into law, the
so-called No Child Left Behind Act, [President Bush] proposed a budget to cut almost
$100 million in funding for the No Child Left Behind Act.”244 Reid expressed
satisfaction with the President’s Commission on Education Excellence for Hispanic
Americans, led by Secretary of Education Rod Paige, but remained disillusioned by
the Bush Administration’s efforts to freeze funding for English Language learning,
bilingual education, and drop-out prevention programs. Reid concluded his remarks
with a call to devote more revenue to support these programs, stating, “The No Child
Left Behind Act provides a blueprint for educational reform. Real reform cannot
occur without real resources. Without adequate funding, it is reform in name only.
That is not enough. We can do better. We must do better.”245
Only a few days later, Senator Ted Kennedy, a fourth of “The Big Four” and a
well-known champion of No Child Left Behind, spoke on Hispanic Education and
declared that “Reform without resources is no reform at all.”246 Here, Kennedy
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referred to his Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions’ report,
“Keeping the Promise: Hispanic Education and America's Future,'' co-authored by the
Congressional Hispanic Caucus. Kennedy continued to describe the irresponsible and
toothless commitment to help Hispanic students who were actually being “left
behind” without investment in districts serving high numbers of Latino/as, cultivating
qualified teachers, and preventing drop-outs.247 Kennedy claimed specific
discrepancies between the funding promised in NCLB and the funding present in
2002: an increase in $742 million to enhance teacher quality, a $219 million increase
to help immigrant youth transition into the school system, and $10 million devoted to
dropout prevention programs all proved to be zero in 2002.248 While difficult to know
the precise funding discrepancies, Reid and Kennedy revealed that key supporters of
No Child Left Behind turned their back on the legislation quickly due to inadequate
funding during implementation.
Finally, the particular accountability model used in No Child Left Behind,
originating in Texas, did not prove to be as successful as promised for Hispanic
students. While noting many supporters of these accountability measures, Angela
Valenzuela devotes an entire book to this argument, entitled Leaving Children
Behind: How “Texas-Style” Accountability Fails Latino Youth. A number of studies
suggest that Texas-style accountability can be effective in schools (such as wellknown research by James Scheurich and Linda Skrla) but Valenzuela argues that this
model is not universally applicable to all settings. 249 Furthermore, Rudalevige
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recognizes that a lot of accountability research was inconclusive in this era, stating,
“While accountability was unproved as a reform tool, there was also no conclusive
evidence that it did not work.”250 Responses to studies on Texas-style accountability
are quite varied and “in many instances accountability actually widens the
achievement gap.”251 Valenzuela further asserts that one will not produce results by
simply making the achievement gap “visible, obvious, and public;” real progress
needs to focus on both inputs and outputs.252
In this text, Valenzuela describes the alleged Texas “miracle” of
accountability as a deeply flawed “mirage” for three primary reasons: 1) For attaching
high-stakes consequences to “a single measure of students’ academic abilities” in the
areas of retention, promotion, and graduation; 2) For encouraging reductionist
curricula by attaching “high-stakes consequences to schools and districts;” and 3)
“For promoting a uniform and objectivist way of knowing, to the detriment of other
cultures, languages, and approaches to knowledge.”253 While Valenzuela believes that
accountability is indisputably necessary in schools, the Texas model of accountability
poorly assesses student understanding and progress and does not promote success in
districts.
During the formation of No Child Left Behind, the Bush Administration
gained validity by flaunting successes with Texas’s accountability model. The same
model, constructed by shared personnel, constituted the blue print for NCLB. As
governor of Texas, George W. Bush implemented a program that assessed schools
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based on student performance on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS)
exams. All students were tested annually in grades 3-8. During his presidential
campaign and lobbying in Congress, Bush boasted about the improvement in TAAS
scores among black and Latino/a students.254 Bush also used the support of Democrat,
education policy advisor, and fellow Texan, Sandy Kress, to convince key actors in
Congress of the legitimacy of Texas-style accountability.255 This evidence helped
persuade Congress and interest groups of the credibility of President Bush’s plan.
While some civil rights leaders, academics, and groups representing Hispanic
interests were skeptical about the powers of Texas accountability, the Bush
Administration’s evidence about minority student gains helped garner enough support
throughout Congress to pass the legislation.
Despite these shortcomings, Valenzuela suggests other methods of
accountability that might more accurately assess student achievement and needs while
still holding teachers and schools accountable for progress. Valenzuela highlights
systems designed in Maine and Rhode Island as models for accountability
frameworks that were more consistent with the needs of Latino/as.256 While these
systems of accountability would not comply with No Child Left Behind, they can
serve as alternatives for future reform. These states’ testing systems allowed teachers
and schools to test using multiple criteria and different media for assessment. In this
design, criteria for assessment were common, but the ways in which students were
assessed could be determined locally. Valenzuela describes this relationship by
stating, “By definition, although the model of assessment and accountability that a
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particular state takes would differ, the principle of multiple assessment criteria (not
multiple tests) on which to evaluate students’ work would be a common
denominator.”257 These alternative measures of accountability illustrate that No Child
Left Behind’s Texas-style accountability was not necessarily a magic bullet, but one
alternative for reform. As there is general consensus that accountability is important,
the Bush Administration’s pseudo-evidence and rhetoric convinced the CHC to
accept this evidence as valid support for Texas-style accountability and support vote
for NCLB with the expectation that these measures would be effective for Hispanic
students.
Conclusion
It should not necessarily come as a surprise that the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus supported the No Child Left Behind Act. The particular politics of the 2000
presidential election and subsequent battles for control over education policy
produced a “perfect storm” for major new reform. These particular circumstances can
be understood within the context of John W. Kingdon’s standard theories of
Congressional decision-making and the arguments made by members of the CHC in
the Congressional Record. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus believed that No
Child Left Behind could reduce achievement gaps over time for Latino/a students.
There is no shortage of scholarship on the implementation and effects of No
Child Left Behind. Researchers have analyzed each provision, each subgroup of
disaggregated data, each state’s measures to comply with the law, and each potential
reform in new policy endeavors. In all of this analysis, it is important for scholars to
consider the nature of public policy itself and the historical disadvantages of Latino/a
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students when assessing expectations for progress. While an average observer may
have trusted that the 2001 ESEA reauthorization would indeed “leave no child
behind,” public policy incrementally builds on existing laws and conditions. The
historical difficulties for Latino/a students provide significant obstacles to overcome
which cannot be diminished in 12 short years. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus
showed support for NCLB because it was the best alternative at the time while having
reserved aspirations for the extent of accelerated advances for Latino/a students.
While recognizing that public policies change slowly and incrementally does
not alleviate the plight of Latino/a students in the United States, understanding public
policy in this way can alter the expectations and attributions of those closest to the
classroom. The No Child Left Behind Act is by no means free from criticism and
ridicule, but the political rhetoric associated with the law prompted teachers, students,
and their families to change how they viewed what was possible in the classroom.
While NCLB may impose unwarranted limitations on instruction and certainly not
ease the challenges of school districts, each of my teachers that used No Child Left
Behind as a scapegoat was at least momentarily distracted from the greater objective
at hand: quality education for all students. As the federal, state, and local
governments aim to address educational inequality in decades to come, it is important
to consider that public policies are designed to resist change. This slow progress
should not paralyze, but rather empower, those in the classroom to address
achievement gaps whenever possible.
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Appendix: List of Abbreviations
AIMS: Arizona’s Instrument to Measure Standards
AYP: Adequate Yearly Progress
BEA: Bilingual Education Act of 1968
CHC: Congressional Hispanic Caucus
CPG: Conditional Party Government
DOE: Department of Education
EEOA: Equal Education Opportunity Act
ELL: English language learner/learning
ESEA: Elementary and Secondary Education Act
ESL: English as a Second Language
IASA: Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994
LEP: Limited English proficient
LESA: Limited English speaking ability
MALDEF: Mexican Legal Defense and Education Fund
NAACP: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAEP: National Assessment of Educational Progress
NCES: National Center for Education Statistics
NCLB: No Child Left Behind
NCLR: National Council of La Raza
NCWC: National Catholic Welfare Council
NDEA: National Defense Education Act
NEA: National Education Association
TAAS: Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
WIDA: World-class Instructional Design and Assessment
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